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We are living in an era when online communication over social network services (SNSs) have become an
indispensable part of people’s everyday lives. As a consequence, online social deception (OSD) in SNSs has
emerged as a serious threat in cyberspace, particularly for users vulnerable to such cyberattacks. Cyber
attackers have exploited the sophisticated features of SNSs to carry out harmful OSD activities, such as
financial fraud, privacy threat, or sexual/labor exploitation. Therefore, it is critical to understand OSD and
develop effective countermeasures against OSD for building a trustworthy SNSs. In this paper, we conducted
an extensive survey, covering (i) the multidisciplinary concepts of social deception; (ii) types of OSD attacks
and their unique characteristics compared to other social network attacks and cybercrimes; (iii) comprehensive
defense mechanisms embracing prevention, detection, and response (or mitigation) against OSD attacks
along with their pros and cons; (iv) datasets/metrics used for validation and verification; and (v) legal and
ethical concerns related to OSD research. Based on this survey, we provide insights into the effectiveness of
countermeasures and the lessons from existing literature. We conclude this survey paper with an in-depth
discussions on the limitations of the state-of-the-art and recommend future research directions in this area.
CCS Concepts: • Security and privacy→ Human and societal aspects of security and privacy; Social
aspects of security and privacy; Privacy protections.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Social media and social network services (SNSs) have become an indispensable part of people’s
everyday lives. In 2018, approximately 70% of Americans reported using social media [119]. This
surge in the popularity of SNSs is due to various benefits that users enjoy, such as easy communi-
cations with others, engagement in civic and political activities, searching jobs, marketing, and/or
exchanging/sharing information or emotional support. Even with these significant benefits, many
people have ambivalent feelings about social media due to privacy concerns and/or deceptive
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activities aiming to harm normal, legitimate users [119]. The proliferation of highly advanced social
media technologies has been exploited by perpetrators as convenient tools for deceiving users [8].
The widespread damages due to online social deception (OSD) attacks have increased significantly in
recent times, with about 25% of people experiencing some types of social deception, such as identity
theft, cyberbullying, fraud, or phishing in 2018 [122]. The serious consequences have led to such
OSD attacks being defined as cybercrimes [108] since early 2000’s. The advanced features of SNS
technologies further have facilitated the significant increase of serious, sophisticated cybercrimes,
beyond simple phishing or spamming, such as human trafficking, online consumer fraud, identity
cloning, hacking, child pornography, and online stalking [149].
It is therefore the need of the hour to understand OSD and develop effective countermeasures
against OSD to develop a trustworthy cyberspace for SNSs. The concept of ‘social deception’ is
highly multidisciplinary and has been extensively studied in various domains, such as psychol-
ogy [3, 103, 123], sociology [75, 95, 118], philosophy [17, 39, 90, 126], behavioral science [52, 76, 138],
public relations [31, 111, 131, 139], communications or linguistics [14, 15, 51, 172], and comput-
ing/engineering [7, 50] (see the multidisciplinary concept of deception discussed in Section 2.1).
Deception is commonly understood as a planned action to mislead a potential victim in order to
achieve a deceiver’s goal, although more general notions of deception have been discussed based on
their various goals and/or intent [124]. Despite this common understanding of deception, different
types of deception have been discussed based on their various goals and/or intent depending on
a different context/domain. The current countermeasures against OSD related cybercrimes have
mainly focused on detecting them using data mining [79], text mining using machine learning (e.g.,
text mining for posts, tweets/retweets, or clicks) [6, 136, 158], or user and network features analysis
using data mining or machine/deep learning [81, 166]. In the cybersecurity domain, deception
is heavily used by both attackers and defenders. Any online deception to achieve a deceiver’s
malicious goals, such as phishing, identity theft, spamming, cyber bullying, grooming, or stalking, is
an act of deception by online social attackers. Defenders also have taken various types of defensive
deception techniques as strategic actions [50].
In this survey paper, our goal is two-fold: (a) to provide an in-depth understanding of online
social deception through the lens of cybersecurity, and (b) to describe and assess the state-of-
the-art countermeasures against OSD as defense mechanisms for its prevention, detection, and
response/mitigation. Although several survey papers have been published on this topic (see Sec-
tion 1.3), there is still a lack of comprehensive survey that embraces the fundamental concepts
and cues of social deception and the key susceptibility factors to the major defense strategies. In
addition, no prior work provided a comprehensive survey on defense strategies to OSD attacks in
terms of prevention, defense, and response/mitigation, and evaluation methodologies discussing
datasets and metrics used in the state-of-the-art literature.
1.2 Research Goal &Questions
To fill the gap identified as above, this study aims to deliver a comprehensive, systematic survey
for researchers to efficiently and effectively grasp a large volume of the state-of-the-art literature
on OSD and its countermeasures in a broad sense. To achieve this goal, the scope of this work
focuses on answering the following research questions:
RQ1: How is online social deception (OSD) affected by the fundamental concepts and characteristics of
social deception which have been studied in multidisciplinary domains?
RQ2: What are new attack types based on the recent trends of OSD attacks observed in real online
worlds and how are they related to common social network attacks, cybercrimes, and security breaches
based on cybersecurity perspectives?
ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: April 2020.
Online Social Deception and Its Countermeasures for Trustworthy Cyberspace: A Survey 3
Table 1. Comparison of the key contributions of our survey paper and other existing survey papers.
Criteria Our
Survey
Rathore
et al.
[120]
Novak
and Li
[106]
Gao et al.
[38]
Fire et al.
[35]
Kayes and
Iamnitchi
[66]
Tsikerdekis
and Zeadally
[146]
Concepts and Characteristics of Online Social Deception
Discussion on
multidisciplinary concepts
✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Deception cues ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ Limited
Spectrum of deception
with/without intentionality
✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Properties of social deception ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Susceptibility factors to OSD
attacks
✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ Limited
Security Threat Categorization/Classification
Fake news ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Rumors ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Information manipulation ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Fake reviews ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Phishing ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
Spamming ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
Fake identity ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Compromised account ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
Profile cloning attack ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
Crowdturfing ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Human trafficking ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Cyberbullying ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗
Cyber-grooming ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗
Cyberstalking ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Existing OSNs Security Solutions
Security issues and challenge ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ Limited ✓
Prevention ✓ Limited ✗ Limited ✓ ✗ Limited
Detection ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
Mitigation ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
Security suggestions ✓ ✓ ✗ Limited ✓ Limited ✗
Discussing Limitation, Pros and Cons of Detection
Ethical Issues ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Discussing Key Limitations ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Pros and Cons of Techniques ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
RQ3: How can the cues of social deception and/or susceptability traits to OSD affect the strategies by
attackers and defenders in OSNs?
RQ4: What kinds of defense mechanisms and/or methodologies still need to be explored to develop
better defense tools combating OSD attacks?
RQ5:What are the key limitations of validaverification methodologies, particularly in terms of datasets
and metrics used in the state-of-the-art approaches?
RQ6:What are the key concerns associated with legal and/or ethical issues in conducting OSD research?
In Section 10, we will discuss how the above research questions have been answered in this paper.
1.3 Comparison with Existing Survey Papers
As social deception leverages online social networks (OSNs) as platforms, there have been several
survey papers [2, 35, 38, 66, 69, 106, 120, 160, 162] discussing social network attacks and/or threats.
Due to the space constraint, we provided the detailed discussion of each existing survey paper in
the appendix document (see Section A).
Based on the existing survey papers [2, 35, 38, 66, 69, 106, 120, 160, 162], we found that there is
no comprehensive survey paper on online social deception (OSD) which sits between OSN threats
and cybercrimes. The most related work discussed above focused on security and privacy issues
and their solutions in OSNs. We demonstrated the key differences in scope and techniques between
our survey paper and the existing OSN security and/or attack papers in Table 1. We compared
them based on a set of criteria in terms of security threat categories, existing security detection
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and suggestions, and discussion of limitations. Most previous studies analyzed various types of
OSN threats and provided detection methods for specific types of security threats. However, they
usually discussed traditional types of security issues, which only partially overlaps our definitions
of social deception threats. We list the key contributions of our survey paper compared to existing
survey papers in the following section.
1.4 Key Contributions
Our survey paper has the following key contributions:
• To understand the fundamental meaning of social deception and its key characteristics, we
comprehensively survey the multidisciplinary concepts and key properties of social deception.
No previous survey paper has addressed all these concepts together to understand the fundamental
meanings of social deception.
• We address a comprehensive set of OSD attacks by following the key properties of social deception
discussed in Section 2.2.We based our survey on fivemajor categories of attacks: false information,
luring, fake identity, crowdturfing, and human targeted attacks. As shown in Table 1, no prior
survey papers have embraced this comprehensive set of OSD attacks. In addition, we outline the
relationships between social network attacks, OSD attacks, and cybercrimes by describing how
they are related to each other, what malicious behaviors are major attacks in each category, and
what are the attack goals of OSD in terms of conventional CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and
availability) security goals.
• To provide a more comprehensive understanding on a system-level defense framework including
all three steps of defense, i.e., prevention, detection, and mitigation/recovery against intrusions
(i.e., OSD attacks in this paper), we extensively survey the three types of defense mechanisms to
fight against the OSD attacks based on a significant amount of references (i.e., 18 papers for preven-
tion for 2008-2019, 31 papers for detection for 2011-2019, and 6 papers for mitigation/response for
2007-2018). These comprehensive surveys of prevention, detection, and mitigation mechanisms
are summarized in Tables A4 – A6 of the appendix document.
• We provide pros and cons of major defense approaches to combat OSD attacks and the overall
trends of the state-of-the-art OSD defense techniques. This gives a reader to understand which
techniques are more relevant in a given context, which may be limited in some resources and/or
requires a more feasible implementation plan.
• We identify the common datasets and metrics that have been used to validate the performance
of defense mechanisms combating the SDN attacks. From this comprehensive survey on datasets
and metrics, we also provide useful directions of the OSD research to enhance the validation and
verification methods, which have not been discussed in other existing survey papers on OSD.
• Based on the extensive survey provided in this work, we also comprehensively discussed key
findings, insights and lessons learned, limitations, and future research directions.
2 CONCEPTS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DECEPTION
The concept of deception is highly multidisciplinary and has been studied in various domains.
In this section, we discuss the root definitions of deception and the fundamental properties of
deception which have been applied in launching OSD attacks in OSN platforms.
2.1 Multidisciplinary Concept of Deception
Let us start by looking at the dictionary definition of deception [25]. Deception is defined as: “To
cause to believe what is false.” However, the definition is too broad and many deception researchers
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raised doubts on the definition.
Fig. 1. The key multidisciplinary concepts
of deception.
In the literature, the concepts of deception have been
discussed with different perspectives under different
disciplines, such as philosophy, behavioral science,
psychology, sociology, public relations, communica-
tion/linguistics, command and control, and comput-
ing/engineering. Due to the space constraint, we simply
summarize the key concept of deception in different dis-
ciplines in Fig. 1. We also provide a detailed discussion
on the concepts of deception under the eight different
disciplines in the appendix document (see Section B Mul-
tidisciplinary Concepts of Deception and Table A1).
In addition, as the threat of phishing emails increases,
an individual online user’s susceptibility to phishing at-
tacks is studied in terms of demographics [86, 110, 134] or
personality traits [22, 32, 48, 49, 99, 116, 117]. We discuss
the details of susceptibility to OSD attacks in Section F
of the appendix document. For easy grasping of the key
multidisciplinary concepts of deception, we summarize
the meanings and goals of deception under each domain in Table A1 of the appendix document.
2.2 Properties of Deception
Via the in-depth literature review, we observe the following key properties of deception:
• Misleading one’s belief: People may use deception intentionally or unintentionally (or mistakenly)
with good or bad intent. However, regardless of intent (good or bad or even without any intent),
deception can mislead one’s belief which is actually false. Since deception as an action induces
confusion or false information (e.g., speaking or acting to induce a misbelief), false beliefs may
be formed regardless of its intent or outcome.
• Impact by deception: Confusion or misbelief introduced by deception brings an outcome which
can be negative or positive based on its original intent and/or its proper execution. However,
when deception with a certain intent is not properly executed as planned or is used mistakenly,
the outcome as its impact may not be predictable, resulting in high uncertainty (e.g., uncertain
outcome). Hence, if deception is intended, it should be planned with multiple scenarios to lower
down the risk introduced by deception in terms of a deceiver’s perspective.
• Success only by a deceivee’s cooperation: For deception to be successful, a deceivee should be
deceived by the deception. Even if deception is performed but the deceiver detects the deception,
not being deceived, no impact of the deception can be introduced.
• Action as a strategy: Deception can be used as a strategy to deal with situations with conflicts.
The aim of the deception with intent is to mislead a target entity’s belief and make the target
choose a suboptimal (or poor) action that can be beneficial for the deceiver to achieve its goal.
• Signals as deception cues: When deception is used, even if it can be very subtle, there exists some
signals. Well-known deception strategies are to increase uncertainty (e.g., no signal increases
uncertainty) or mislead one’s belief (e.g., a false signal leads to false beliefs). Although both
deception techniques aim to make a deceiver choose a wrong decision, if deception by misleading
with false signal is detected, this provides more information about a deceiver to a deceivee than
providing no signal.
• Effect of intent: Although deception is mostly understood as a negative action taken by an entity
with bad intent, it can appear as misconception about situations or information. If the deceiver
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mistakenly uses deception (e.g., sending false information as it believes it is true at the time the
information is found), after the truth is known, it can fix its stance/action. In addition, if the
deception does not have bad intent behind it, but it impacts negatively in the current situation,
the deceiver may reveal its intent to resolve any conflict derived from the deception.
Investigating the key properties of deception is critical in developing defense mechanisms to combat
OSD attacks as the features of deception-based attacks, distinguished from other common online
social network attacks. In this section, we discussed a variety of cues and susceptability traits of
social deception behaviors across online and offline platforms. Thanks to the fast advances of social
media and online social network technologies, many offline deception characteristics tend to be
easily observed even in online deception behaviors. However, due to the limited real-time and/or
interactions feeling people’s presence in online platforms with the current state-of-the-art SNSs
and social media technologies, some physiological or psychological cues may not be applicable in
detecting online social deception. In addition, upon the detection of the deception, a deceiver can
easily get out of the online situation while a deceivee can easily lose a track of the deceiver. Now
we look into various types of online social deception behaviors currently studied in the literature.
3 TYPES OF ONLINE SOCIAL DECEPTION
We categorize OSD attacks to mislead people’s beliefs by the following strategy types: false infor-
mation, luring, fake identity, crowdturfing, and human targeted attacks (summarized in Table A2 of
the appendix document). Further, we discuss how OSD attacks differ from other OSN attacks and
what security goals each OSD attack aims to breach.
3.1 False Information
False information on the web and social media can be classified asmisinformation and disinformation.
Misinformation can be considered as ‘deception without intent’ which mistakenly misleads people’s
belief due to the false information propagated. Disinformation can be categorized as ‘deception with
intent,’ aiming to mislead people’s beliefs. False information can be also categorized as opinion-based
vs. fact-based. The opinion-based false information propagates without ground truth. On the other
hand, the fact-based false information misleads people’s beliefs due to the fraud from ground truth,
such as hoaxes and fake news in social media [61].
Jiang and Wilson [61] compared and summarized different definitions and ranges of misinforma-
tion, based on two critera, veracity and intentionality [135], as follows:
• Fake News: Fake news caused by serious fabrications or large-scale hoaxes[125] has spread wildly
since the beginning of the 2016 US presidential election cycle. Flintham et al. [36] reported
that two third of survey respondents accessed news via Facebook. Facebook and Twitter have
banned thousands of pages and identified as the major culprit of generating and promoting
misinformation [61]. Fact-checking from different sources is a means to determine the veracity
of social media posts. Vosoughi et al. [155] found that fake news spread faster than truthful news.
The time lag between fake news and fact-checking by fact-checking websites (for automatic
fact-checking) is 10-20 hours [133].
• Rumors: Vosoughi et al. [154] defined a rumor as an unverified assertion that starts from one or
more sources and spreads over time from one user to another user in a network. A rumor can be
validated as true or false via real-time verification in Twitter or remain unresolved.
• Information Manipulation: One of the causes of information manipulation is opportunistic dis-
information [24]. This means false information is deliberately and often covertly spread (e.g.,
planting a rumor) in order to influence public opinions or obscure the truth. Opportunistic
disinformation falls into two categories: financially or politically incentivized.
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False Information Luring Fake Identity Crowdturfing Human Tar-
geted Attacks
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Fig. 2. Research work count for five categories of deception: False Information, Luring, Fake Identity, Crowd-
turfing and Human Targeted Attacks and subcategories.
• Deceptive Online Comments/Review: Malicious users write fake reviews, opinions, or comments
in social media to mislead other users. Fake reviews can be generated automatically [166].
3.2 Luring
Deception can be realized by luring people. The most common luring techniques are as follows:
• Spamming: Social media platform users can receive unsolicited messages (spam) that are ranging
from advertising to phishing messages [120]. The Attackers usually send spam messages in bulk
to influence many normal users.
• Phishing: Online phishing attacks, such as phishing webpages, are one type of cybercrimes that
can lure users to reveal sensitive information and steal privacy data or financial information
through social engineering techniques [27]. Attackers exploit the financial credentials and other
personal data in daily life in other fraudulent activities [1]. Those illegal activities can cause
sever economic losses and threaten credibility and financial security of OSN users. Kaspersky
Lab’s quarterly Spam and phishing report [151] showed that phishing attacks are increasing
in Q1 2019. Attackers use social networks to reach their targets and even launched advertising
campaigns using celebrities. Scammers exploited high-profit media events to redirect users to
their phishing links and scam websites, such as Apple product launch and holiday celebration.
Banks are established as the top phishing targets. Phishing links can be also found from emails
to force users to update accounts or payment information.
3.3 Fake Identity
This section discusses the following OSD attacks associated with fake identity:
• Fake Profile (a.k.a. Sybil attack): In OSNs, attackers create a huge amount of fake identities for
their own benefits. For example, in Facebook, personal information, such as e-mail and physical
addresses, date of birth, employment data were leaked. Identity theft can access photographs of
the friends of the victims; in addition, fraudsters steal money [47].
• Profile Cloning: Attackers secretly create a duplicate of existing user profile in the same or different
social media platforms. Since the cloned profile resembles the current profile, attackers can utilize
the friend relationship and deceive and send friend requests to the contacts of the cloned user.
By constructing the trust relationship, the attacker can steal sensitive data from the existing
user’s friends. Profile cloning exposed severe threats because attackers can commit even serious
cybercrimes, such as cyberbullying, cyberstalking, and blackmail [120].
• Compromised accounts: Legitimate user accounts can be hacked by attackers and then those
accounts are compromised by attackers [29]. Unlike Sybil accounts, compromised accounts are
originally maintained by real users with normal social network usage history and have established
social connections.
3.4 Crowdturfing
In this section, we discuss human attackers who are paid workers to achieve their employer’s
malicious intent, called crowdturfing. Crowdturfing refers to the behavior that participants of
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an astroturfing campaign are organized by crowdsourcing systems [156]. Crowturfing gathers
crowdturfing workers and spreads fake information to mislead people’s beliefs and/or opinions.
Crowdturfing activities in social media exploit social networking platforms (e.g., instant message
groups, microblogs, blogs, and online forums) as themain information channel of the campaign [162].
The crowdturfing in social media is usually involved with spreading malicious URLs, forming
astroturf campaigns, and manipulating. Crowdturfing workers spread information and posts from
their social media accounts. This is hard to detect because their social media accounts are mixed
with normal posts as a camouflage. Campaign types in both Chinese crowdsourcing sites [156]
and Western sites [82] have been studied. Three classes of crowdturfers (i.e., professional users,
casual users, and middlemen) are identified in Twitter networks. In addition, their profile, activity,
and linguistic characteristics have been analyzed to detect workers [81]. Wang et al. [157] studied
adversarial attacks against machine learning (ML) models of detecting malicious crowdsourcing
workers. Two types of adversarial attacks were identified: evasion attacks (i.e., attackers change
behavioral features) and poisoning attacks (i.e., administrators pollute training data). ML is the best
classifier to detect crowdturfing activity. The powerful features are user interactions and tweet
dynamics. Evasion attacks can be very powerful when attackers have total knowledge. Poison
attacks can reduce the detection efficacy by injecting carefully crafted data.
3.5 Human Targeted Attacks
Recently, OSD attacks are extended to directly hurt humans which are obviously considered as
cybercrimes. We discuss the following human related targeted OSD attacks: human trafficking,
cyberbullying, cybergrooming, and cyberstalking. Each OSD attack under this category is detailed as:
• Human Trafficking: Offline traditional human trafficking means traffickers kidnap the victims
(mostly victims women and children) for trading. There are labor trafficking and sex trafficking
but less than half of the victims are in the sex trade [34]. Cybertrafficking is traffickers using
cyber platforms to exploit a great number of victims and advertise service across geographic
boundaries [77]. Cybertrafficking is defined as traffickers transport persons by using any elec-
tronic, cyber platforms (e.g., social media, Internet services, etc.) to ‘coerce, deceive, or consent’
with the aim of ‘exploitation’ [44].
• Cyberbullying: This is one type of cybercrime attacks that commits the deliberate and repetitive
online harassing of someone, especially adolescents [120]. Cyberbullying causes serious fear and
harms for the victims through the online platforms.
• Cybergrooming: This is another type of cybercrime attacks that the adult criminals intend to
have sexual abuse activities with a child and hunt for children victims and create emotional
connection in online social media platforms [120, 168].
• Cyberstalking: The malicious users and cybercriminals exploit the normal user’s online informa-
tion and harass them by cyberstalking [120]. Without proper information security protection,
many personal information can be disclosed in social media platforms unintentionally. From
user’s profiles, posting and connections, the sensitive information revealed may include phone
number, home address, location, and schedules.
3.6 Relationship between Social Deception Attacks, Social Network Attacks and
Cybercrimes
Social network attacks, including traditional threats, social threats and multimedia content threats,
are the general security threats concerned in the literature [120]. Those security and privacy threats
include all the detrimental activities with malicious intent. Social deception is part of social network
attacks, as shown in Fig. 3, because social deception attacks can only be successful when the victims
are being deceived from the attacker’s perspective.
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Fig. 3. The relationships between OSN attacks, social
deception, and cybercrime.
Three types of social network attacks are con-
sidered the online social deception (OSD) at-
tacks: Unsolicited fake information attacks,
identity attacks, crowdturfing, and human tar-
geted attacks. The specific types of attacks
were described in Section 3. Some OSD at-
tacks (e.g., personal and confidential informa-
tion leakout, identity theft) have been treated
as cybercrimes [108] since early 2000’s. The ad-
vanced features of social network service tech-
nologies further have facilitated the significant
increase of serious, sophisticated cybercrimes,
such as human trafficking, online consumer fraud, identity cloning, hacking, child pornography,
and/or online stalking [149].
Table 2. OSD attack types and their
impact on security breach.
Social
Deception
Attack
Security Breach
Fake News Data Integrity
Rumors Data Integrity
Information
Manipulation
Data Integrity
Fake Reviews Data Integrity
Spamming Account
Confidentiality
Phishing Account
Confidentiality
Fake Profile Account Integrity
Profile Cloning
Attack
Authentication
Compromised
Account
Account Integrity,
Account Availability
Crowdturfing Data Integrity,
Network Integrity
Human
trafficking
Confidentiality,
Safety
Cyberbullying Confidentiality,
Safety
Cyber-grooming Confidentiality,
Safety
Cyberstalking Confidentiality,
Safety
Fig. 3 illustrates the relations between OSN attacks, OSD
attacks, and cybercrime. Although cybercrime is considered
most serious as cyberattacks, we can observe there are many
attacks that overlap to each other. OSD attacks overlap either
OSN attacks or cybercrime or both. Cybercrimes, such as con-
sumer fraud, cryptojacking, enterprise ransomware, supply
chain attacks, and malicious email attacks [142] fall in a sep-
arate group because these attacks are spread in the Internet,
which is much broader than OSN platforms. There are no ex-
plicit guidelines if certain OSN attacks or threats are illegal
or if threats are illegal but their impact may not be direct. For
example, when a user’s data privacy (or integrity) is breached
but no actually loss is found, it is hard to predict if there are
future security concerns. When the influences of OSN attacks
are worse toward attack victims or organizations, the concept
of social deception can define these security concerns.
Although cybercriminals caused serious adverse effects to
the society and individuals, 44% of the victims reported to
the police [42]. Victims’ reporting is a beneficial practice to
increase the awareness of the communities to defend against
potential cybercrimes. Victims may report to not only the
police, but also the corporation in an active dialogue environment, or share the victim stories
to families and close friends [42]. Cybercriminal profiling is highly challenging, compared to
profiles of traditional criminals; however, it is very beneficial to identify common characteristics of
cybercriminals [108]. Profiling can follow the procedure in the Behavioral Evidence Analysis [147].
Since most cybercrime victims are corporations and/or their customers, corporations can predict
the potential insider criminals more intelligently with the help of cybercriminal profiling [108].
3.7 Security Goals Breach by Online Social Deception Attacks
The CIA (confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) triad security goals play a major role in the
information security practice. With the growth of socio-technical security issues, the original
CIA triad is expanded with more specialized aspects, such as authentication and non-repudiation
[94]. However, they still have limitations in systems and data for the wider organizational and
social aspects of security [128]. OSN security has three levels of security goals: network-level,
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account-level, and message-level. Achieving the CIA security goals can contribute to all social
network security levels. We summarize how OSD attacks can breach security goals in Table 2.
As the OSD research is closely related to many different disciplines studying human behaviors, a
variety of deception cues have been studied in the literature. For the readers who may be interested
in obtaining insights from those studies to develop tools to deal with OSD attacks based on the
deception cues, we discussed various types of deception cues in the appendix document (see Section
D Cues of Social Deception). In addition, it is critical to investigating the victim profiles in terms of
the predictors of potential victims’ vulnerabilities to the OSD attacks for taking proactive actions
to prevent them. For those who are interested in the detailed survey on the susceptibility to the
OSD, we also discussed it in the appendix document (see Section F Susceptibility to Online Social
Deception).
4 PREVENTION MECHANISMS OF ONLINE SOCIAL DECEPTION
As the first set of defense mechanisms against OSD attacks, we discuss defense mechanisms to
prevent OSD attacks in terms of using two types of techniques: Data-driven prevention mechanisms
and social honeypots as discussed below.
4.1 Data-Driven Prevention Mechanisms
Compared to their detection mechanisms, as discussed in Section 5, defense mechanisms to prevent
OSD attacks have been less explored. But in this paper, to make our survey complete, we discuss
several types of prevention mechanisms that have been commonly used to deal with OSD attacks
based on data-driven approaches, as follows:
• Fake News Prevention: Saad et al. [127] proposed a blockchain-based system to fight against
fake news by recording a transaction in blockchain when posting a news article and applying
authentication consensus of the record. The result was indicated by an authentication indicator
along with the post. In this design, when a user saw a post, authentication indicator showed
the status of verification: successful, failed or pending. This mechanism achieved three goals
of preventing fake news spread in the OSN: swift consensus was issued by the chaincode; the
malicious user can be identified from the transaction record; and the false information posts can
be deleted and a penalty can be applied to the fake news attackers. In general, the malicious
attackers are the normal users but normal users do not have write access to the blockchain. Only
the information source from a group of publishers or a group of social network are allowed to
commit transactions to the blockchain.
• Phishing Prevention: Florêncio and Herley [37] proposed a phishing prevention method with
a client reporting user password reuse activities in unknown websites and a server to make
decisions and update the blocked list. The benefit is detecting phishing attacks reliably with
low latency. Gupta and Pieprzyk [46] proposed a defense model to classify web-pages on a
collaborative platform PhishTank. This defense model uses a plug-in method into a browser to
check blacklisting and blocking lists.
• Identity Theft Prevention: Tsikerdekis [145] discussed a proactive approach of identity deception
prevention using social network data. Data in common contribution networks are used to establish
a community’s behavioral profile. Malicious accounts can be barred before joining a community
based on the deviation of user behaviors from the community’s profile.
• Cyberbullying Prevention: Dinakar et al. [26] proposed a dashboard reflective user interface in
social network platforms for both cyberbullying attackers and victims. The reflective user interface
integrated notifications, action delay, and interactive education. Their user study revealed that
the in-context dynamic help in the user interface is effective for the end-users.
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Pros and Cons: These effective system design and real-time data analysis would be reliable to
prevent online social deception. However, there is no real-world implementation of those proposed
methods. Response delay issues may exist for the implementation.
4.2 Social Honeypots
Recently, there has been an idea that creating social network avatars (often called ‘good bots’ in
contrast to ‘bad bots’) may be a good solution to identify malicious activities by highly intelligent,
sophisticated attacks, such as advanced persistent attacks (APTs) [152]. Honeypots technology is
not new and has been popularly used in communication networks as a defensive deception to
proactively deal with attackers by luring them to honeypots, preventing them from accessing a
target [20]. The existing approaches using social honeypots have mainly focused on detecting social
spammers, socialbots [176], or malware [79, 80, 113–115, 140, 159] as a passive monitoring tool.
These works use some profiles of attackers to detect them based on the features collected from
the social honeypots placed as fake SNS accounts (e.g., Facebook or Twitter). But no real victim
profiles have been used to develop the social honeypots.
Although the original purpose of social honeypots was to proactively prevent attackers from
accessing system/network resources, they have been used as a complement to detect various OSN
attacks. However, the original purpose of social honeypots lies in a proactive intrusion prevention
mechanism. In addition, although the social honeypots can be used as a detection tool for OSN or
OSD attacks, their goal is an early detection or mitigation based on the proactive defense in nature.
Hence, we include social honeypots as prevention mechanisms of OSD attacks.
For the social honeypots to be used as detection mechanisms, they are defined as information
resources that monitor a spammer’s behaviors and log their information (e.g., their profiles and
contents in social networking communities) [79]. This early study detected deceptive spam profiles
in MySpace and Twitter by social honeypot deployment. Based on the spammer they attracted, a
Support Vector Machine (SVM) spam classifier was trained to identify spammers and legitimate
users. AnML-based classifier was also developed to identify unknown spammers with high precision
in two social network communities.
Lee et al. [80] detected content polluters in Twitter by designing Twitter-based social honeypots.
The 60 social honeypot accounts follow other social honeypot accounts and post four types of
tweets to each other. They investigated the harvested users to nine clusters via the Expectation-
Maximization algorithm. They did content polluters classification by Random Forest and improved
the results by standard boosting and bagging and by different feature group combinations.
Haddadi and Hui [47] focused on privacy and fake profiles by characterizing fake profiles
and reducing the threats of identity theft. They set social honeypots using the fake identities of
celebrities and ordinary people and analyzed the different behaviors (e.g., a number of friends,
friends requests, and public/private messages) between those fake accounts. Stringhini et al. [140]
studied 900 honey-profiles to detect spammers in three social network communities (e.g., MySpace,
Facebook, and Twitter). They collected activity data for a long time (i.e., one year). Their honey-
profiles have geographic networks. In addition, this work identified both spam profiles and spam
campaigns based on the shared URL.
Virvilis et al. [152] described the common characteristics of advanced persistent threat (APT) and
malicious insiders and discussed multiple deception techniques for early detection of sophisticated
attackers, including creation of social network avatars in attack preparation phase (information
gathering), along with fake DNS records and HTML comments. Zhu et al. [176] showed the
analysis and simulation of infiltrating social honeybots defense into botnets of social networks.
The framework SODEXO (SOcial network Deception and EXploitation) had three components:
Honeybot Deployment (HD), Honeybot Exploitation (HE), and Protection and Alert System (PAS).
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HD set up a moderate number of honeybots in the social network. HE modeled the dynamics and
utility optimization of honeybots and botmaster by a Stackelberg game model. The results showed
that a small number of honeybots can significantly decrease the infected population (i.e., a botnet)
in a large social network.
Paradise et al. [113] and Paradise et al. [114] simulated defense account monitoring attack strate-
gies in OSNs. The attackers sent friend requests to some community members chosen by different
attacker strategies. In addition, the attackers may have full knowledge of the defence strategies. The
defender chose a set of accounts to monitor based on various criteria. They analyzed the acceptance
rate, hit rate, a number of friends before hit, and monitoring cost between combinations of attackers
and defenders. The result showed that under the sophisticated attackers with the full knowledge of
defence strategies, defense using PageRank and most connected profiles have the best detection
with the minimum cost.
Paradise et al. [115] targeted at detecting the attackers in the reconnaissance stage of advanced
persistent threat (APT). The social honeypot artificial profiles were assimilated into an organi-
zational social network (Xing and LinkedIn) and received the friend requests to organization
employees. The attacker profiles collected in the social honeypot were analyzed. Badri Satya et al.
[10] collected fake Likers on Facebook by posting paid jobs using linkage and honeypot pages. They
extracted the four types of profile and behavior features and trained classifiers to detect fake Likers.
The temporal features were cost-efficient compared to the previous research. They also evaluated
the robustness of their work by modifying features using individual attack model and coordinated
attack model. De Cristofaro et al. [23] studied paying for ‘likes fraud’ in Facebook and link the
campaigns to honeypot pages to collect data. They analyzed and measured the page advertising and
promotion activities. Nisrine et al. [104] discovered malicious profiles by social honeypot(s) and
used both feature-based strategy and honeypot feature-based strategy to collect data. Combining
honeypot features can increase the ML accuracy and recall compared to when traditional features
are only used. Zhu [174] defined “active honeypots” as active Twitter accounts, which capture
more than 10 new spammers everyday, similar to the spammer network hubs. They extracted
1,814 those accounts from the Twitter space and studied the properties and identification of active
honeypots. Yang et al. [164] conducted passive social honeypot to capture a spammer’s preferences
by designing social honeypots with various behaviors. The design considered tweet behavior (i.e.,
tweet frequency, tweet keywords, and tweet topics), followed behaviors of famous people’s accounts
and application installation. They analyzed which type of social honeypot has the highest capture
rate and designed advanced social honeypot based on their results. They demonstrated that the
advanced honeypot can capture spammers 26 times faster than the normal social honeypots.
Pros and Cons: Social honeypots would be highly effective particularly when it is well deployed to
attract targeted attackers. However, developing social honeypots with fake accounts may introduce
ethical issues because the use of the social honeypots itself is based on deceiving all other users as
well.
5 DETECTION MECHANISMS OF ONLINE SOCIAL DECEPTION
Most existing defense mechanisms to deal with OSD attacks focus on detecting those attacks. We
discuss those detection mechanisms based on three types: user profile-based, message content-based,
and network feature-based.
5.1 User Profile-based Deception Detection Mechanisms
Most profile cloning studies make use of the user profiles [65, 67, 132]. Identify cloned profiles,
they all calculate profile similarities in different ways by using user profile attributes. Kontaxis et al.
[67] proposed three components to detect profile cloning: an information distiller, a profile hunter,
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and a profile verifier. The profile verifier component calculated the profile similarity score between
testing social profiles and the user’s original profile. Both the information field and profile pictures
contributed to estimating the profile similarity. Kamhoua et al. [65] detected user profiles across
multiple OSNs in a supervised learning classifier. The method consists of three steps: the profile
information collection from a friend request, the friend list identity verification, and the report
of possible colluders. The binary classifier was based on both the profile attributes similarity and
friend list similarity. Shan et al. [132] simulated profile cloning attacks by snowball sampling and
iteration attack and then detected the attackers by a detector called ‘ChoneSpotter.’ The context-free
detection algorithm includes the profile information and friendship connections. The input features
include recently used IPs, a freind list, and the profile and profile similarity. A cloned profile was
determined by using the same IP prefix and the similarity over a certain threshold.
Some mechanisms detecting Sybil attacks, fake reviews and spamming extracted user profile
features and user behavior/ activity features to detect malicious accounts [10, 16, 21, 85, 115, 137,
158]. Badri Satya et al. [10] studied the feature engineering from the account of ‘fake likers.’ They
considered profile features, such as the length of user introduction, the longevity of an account,
and the number of friends. Social activities represent a unique attribute observed in OSN and
consist of the behavior features of an account, such as sending friend request, posting, retweeting,
liking/disliking and social attention [10]. More specific features under each activity category can be
further extracted, such as the acceptance of a friend request sent from [115] and the average time
interval of posting from [137]. Wang et al. [158] investigated several behavioral signatures for the
output of crowdturfing campaigns and tasks. Cao and Caverlee [16] studied the behavioral features
to detect spam URLs in OSNs. They used fifteen click and posting-based features in Random Forest
classifiers and evaluated the top six features.
Cresci et al. [21] proposed a novel DNA-inspired social fingerprinting approach of behavioral
modeling to detect spambot accounts. Twitter account behaviors were encoded as a string of
behavioral units (e.g., tweet, reply and retweet). This new model can deal with the new type of
spambots which can be easily missed by most traditional tools. Social fingerprinting sequences
are characterized by the longest common substring (LCS) curve. Spambots are related to high LCS
values by sharing suspicious long behavioral patterns. The LCS curve from behavioral model is
used to detect more sophisticated types of crowdsourcing spammers.
User profiles and activities are the key features to detect OSD attacks (e.g, advanced spammers
or crowdturfing), along with other content-based and graph-based features [57, 79–81, 154, 157].
Those hybrid detection examples will be discussed later in Section 5.4.
Pros and Cons: User profile information provides specific activity features and behaviors about
each user. However, some profile information is private; thus, collecting private information itself
is the violation of a user’s privacy right. In addition, even if the information itself is open to the
public, how to use the information should be agreed with the owner of the information. Besides,
collecting profile and behavioral data incurs high cost and/or time under privacy protection of the
social media platforms.
5.2 Message Content-based Deception Detection Mechanisms
In Table A5 in the appendix document, we showed that the majority of social deception detection
approaches have used content-based features because the text of user posts and reviews can be easily
collected and analyzed using existing linguistic models. The proliferation of social media and/or
network applications allowed numerous types of raw and advanced content features available.
Topic modeling and sentiment-based features have been popularly utilized for the linguistic analysis
of deceptive messages.
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5.2.1 Topic Modeling-based Detection. Most of the work built topic distribution by Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [78, 87, 137, 141, 161]. If each user’s posts are collected as a document,
LDA generates the topic probability distribution of the user’s document. Liu et al. [87] extended
the topic features to two new features. A global outlier standard score (GOSS) indicates a user’s
interests in specific topics, compared to other users while a local outlier standard score (LOSS)
indicates a user’s interests in various topics. By adding those two topic-based features to classifiers,
the averaged F1-score shows better performance. Swe and Myo [141] built a keyword “blacklist"
to detect fake accounts by extracting topics from LDA and keywords from TF-IDF algorithms.
The blacklist contributed to 500 fake words. The number and ratio of fake words and a few other
content-based features were extracted for their classifier. The result using a “blacklist" showed
better accuracy than the traditional spam word list by reducing false positive rate. Wu et al. [161]
extracted the topic distribution of 18 topics for one message following the official Weibo topic
categories. The probability of 18 topics was used as one feature vector for the SVM classifier.
Two other work modified the LDA algorithm to detect cybercriminal accounts and spams. Lau
et al. [78] developed a weakly supervised cybercriminal network mining method supported by a
probability generative model and a novel context-sensitive Gibbs sampling algorithm (CSLDA).
The algorithm can extract the semantically rich representations of latent concepts to predict
transactional and collaborative relationships (e.g., cybercriminal indicator) in publicly accessible
messages posted on social media. Song et al. [137] used Labeled Latent Dirichlet Allocation (L-LDA)
to indicate the probability of co-occurrence. The latent topics were normalized to topic-based
features, which has distinct properties with TF-IDF generated word-based features.
Golbeck et al. [41] detected two types of false article stories, which are fake news and satires by
themes and word vectors. Then they defined a theme by a new codebook with 7 theme types, such
as conspiracy theory and hyperbolic criticism. Multiple themes can be labelled to an article as a
theme coding. The proposed classifier worked better for articles under a certain type of theme.
Pros and Cons: The topic features can be easily obtained. However, the content-only features may
not be able to capture other dynamic information such as user activites describing the interactions
with other users (e.g., likes, acceptance of friend requests). In addition, the topic model is highly
sensitive to datasets; hence, depending on datasets, the effectiveness of topic models cannot be
guaranteed.
5.2.2 Feature-based Deception Detection. Table A5 in the appendix document lists the feature
set of each research work. The commonly used features include raw features, such as word vector,
word embedding, hashtags, links and URLs [91]. Advanced features include deep content features,
statistics, Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) and other metadata, such as location, source,
or time [150]. Most ML-based models are supervised models. Among the supervised models, random
forest, support vector machine (SVM), naïve Bayes, logistic regression, and k-nearest neighbors
are the most favorable classifiers for detection. Neural network models, such as Recurrent Neural
Networks (RNN) [166] and Convolutional Neural Network with Long Short-Term Memory (CNN-
LSTM) [165], are used for textural features. Temporal models, such as Dynamic Time Warping
(DTW) andHiddenMarkovModels (HMM) [33, 154], are discussed in rumor detection. The boosting-
based ensemble models are implemented for spammmer detection [57, 165]. A few studies used
semi-supervised models [57, 129] when the labeled dataset is not available.
Everett et al. [33] studied the veracity of the automated online reviews regular users. The text is
generated by second-order Markov chain model. The key findings include: (i) The negative crowd’s
opinion reviews are more believable to humans; (ii) Light-hearted topics are easier to deceive than
the factual topics; and (iii) Automated text on adult content is the most deceptive. Yao et al. [166]
investigated attacks of fake Yelp restaurant reviews generated by an RNN model and LSTM model.
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The model considers the reviews themselves only, not including metadata as reviewers. Similarity
feature, structural features, syntactic features, semantic features, and LIWC features were used in
SVM to compare the character-level distribution. They found that information loss was incurred
in the process of generating fake reviews from RNN models and the generated reviews can be
detected against real reviews. Song et al. [136] detected crowdturfing targets and retweets from
crowdturfing websites and black-market sites.
Pros and Cons: Feature-based models have high accuracy and low false positive rates. The raw
content features are easily obtainable although the extraction of sophisticated features are expensive.
However, the temporal pattern of messages influence the detection rate and performance. The
semantic analysis method may ignore the hidden messages and background knowledge. In addition,
the model requires tuning many input parameters.
5.2.3 Sentiment-based Deception Detection. Sentiment of social media messages serves as
extra features of message contents. Sentiment provides emotional involvement, such as like, agree,
or negation. It is calculated by lexicon analysis [12, 26, 55, 61, 153]. One research aims at designing
better lexicon [61]. ComLex was introduced as a novel emotional and topical lexicon. This work
analyzed the linguistic signals in user comments, regarding misinformation and fact-checking.
Specifically, it discussed the signals from user comments to misinformation posts, veracity of social
media posts, or fact-checking effects. There are signals for positive fact-checking effect as well
as signals (e.g., increased swear word usage) indicating potential “backfire” effects [107], where
attempts to intervene against misinformation only entrench the original false belief.
Sentiment features are often used along with TF-IDF word vectors. Supervised classifiers in
current research utilize sentiment analysis to improve prediction. Bhatt et al. [12] detected fake
news stance from neural embedding, n-gram TF vector and sentiment difference between news
headline-body TF vector pair. Dinakar et al. [26] proposed a sentiment analysis to predict bullying,
aiming at discovering goals and emotions behind the contents. Note that Ortony lexicon [112]
maintains a list of positive and negative words describing the affect. The lexicon of negative words
was only added in the feature list to detect bully-related rude comments.
Pros and Cons: Sentiment analysis includes more emotional and background information, in
addition to the explicit content, which can increase the prediction accuracy, when compared to
semantic-only methods. However, the use of sentiment analysis cannot fully leverage the linguistic
information in the contents where the lexicon is domain-specific.
5.3 Network Structure Feature-Based Detection
Several general network features were extracted in supervised learning methods, such as topology,
node in-degree and out-degree, edge weight, and clustering coefficient [71, 121, 154]. Wu et al.
[160] summarized false information spreader detection based on network structures. Ratkiewicz
et al. [121] built Truthy system to enable the detection of astroturfing on Twitter. Their Truthy
system extracted a whole set of basic network features for each meme and sent those features with
a meme mood by sentiment analysis to supervised learning toolkit. Kumar et al. [71] developed
four feature sets including network features to identify hoaxes in Wikipedia. The network features
measure the relation between the references of the article in the Wikipedia hyperlink network. The
performance of features sets was evaluated in a random forest classifier.
Below we discuss algorithms and supervised learning methods specifically designed for the
network structure, such as propagation-based models, graph optimization algorithms, and graph
anomaly detection algorithms.
5.3.1 Epidemic Models. Epidemic model is a direct way to model and simulate the diffusion of
disease [102]. Since the spread of disease in a certain population is similar to the propagation of
false information in the social media communities, epidemic models have been often modified to
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quantify the extent of false information propagation [62]. The epidemic models are agent-based
models, where an individual node can be described as an agent. Different types of agents are
characterized by distinct states and behaviors, such as the agents Susceptible (S), Infectious (I), and
Recovered (R) in the traditional SIR (Susceptible, Infectious, and Recovered) model [100] in false
information propagation. In OSNs, agents in the SIR model represent a group of users in each state
as follows: (i) Susceptible (S): Users who have not received information (e.g., rumor posts or fake
news) yet but are susceptible to receive and believe it; (ii) Infectious (I ): Users who received the
information and can actively spread it; and (iii) Recovered (R): Users who received the information
and refuse to spread it [169].
The state transitions are S to I by infection rate β , and I to R by recovery rate γ depicted in
Fig. 4a. The current false information propagation research has two tracks employing the epidemic
models: (i) Adding more links and parameters to the traditional SIR model; or (ii) Building SEIZ
model (Susceptible, Exposed, Infected, and Skeptic–Z; discussed below) to fit to the OSN data.
SIR Model with Variations. Many variants of the basic SIR models have been proposed in the
current false information propagation research. Zhao et al. [169] added forgetting mechanisms to
the SIR model for rumor spreading, so that the spreader (I ) can be converted to stiflers (R). Stiflers
are defined similar to Recovered state. They used the population size of R to measure the impact of
rumor. They found that a forgetting mechanism can help reduce rumor influence and the rumor
saturation threshold can be influenced by the average degree of nodes in the network. Another
Hibernator state (i.e., users who refuse to spread rumor just because they forgot) was added to the
SIHR (Susceptible, Infectious, Hibernator, and Recovered) model [170] to measure forgetting rate α
and remembering mechanism η. The new remembering mechanism was proved to delay the rumor
termination time and reduce rumor maximum influence. The direct link from S to R was added by
[170] and were extended by [171]. The update was that all users in state S were finally converted to
either I or R state if they had the chance to be exposed to spreaders (I ). Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b describe
the SIR and SIHR models, respectively.
Cho et al. [19] extended the basic SIR model by replacing the transition between states to a
decision based on the agent’s belief on the extent of uncertainty in the agent’s opinion. The
Subjective Logic opinion model is used to model an agent’s opinion composition and update based
on the extent of uncertainty. The three states in the SIR are defined based on the degree of each
dimension of an opinion which is defined by belief, disbelief, and uncertainty. The opinion update
involved interaction similarity between two agents, a conflict measure between belief and disbelief,
and opinion decay upon no interactions between agents for opinion updates. Based on the degree
of uncertainty in a given opinion, an agent’s opinion can move from any state to any other state.
This work investigated the effect of misinformation and disinformation in terms of how well false
information can be effectively mitigated by propagating countering (true) information by selecting
a good set of true informers.
The evolutionary SIR model simulation has been used to model decision strategies in fake news
attacks [68]. The state transitions in the SIR model was replaced by the decision model Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD). The deception strategies can modify the prior knowledge of the agents by
either adding uncertainty or changing false perceptions. In their expensive simulation experiments,
only a small population of fake news attackers can initiate the spread but the fitness of attackers
was sensitive to the cost of deception.
SEIZ Model with Variations. Jin et al. [62] captured diffusion of false and true news by the SEIZ
epidemic model. Instead of considering the Recovered state, they modeled a state of users being
heard of the rumor but not spreading it (Skeptic, Z) and influenced users (E) posting the rumor with
an exposure delay. The SEIZ model was accurately capturing the diffusion patterns in real news
and rumors events and was evaluated to be better than the simple SIS (Susceptible, Infectious, and
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(a) SIR Model (b) SIHR Model (c) SEIZ Model
Fig. 4. Three types of agent-based epidemic models. The solid line arrows are transitions from one state to
another states with probabilites. The dotted line arrows are the transaction that may not exist at all times.
(a) SIR model: β is infection rate, γ is recovery rate, and ξ is the rate of Recovered to Susceptible. (b) SIHR
model: α is stifling rate, β is refusing rate, γ is spreading rate, δ is forgetting rate, η is wakened remembering
rate, and ξ is spontaneous remembering rate. (c) SEIZ model: β is infection rate, ϵ is self-adoption rate, ϕ is
contact rate, and ξ is skeptic rate. The details of p and l and the whole model were explained in Jin et al. [62].
Susceptible) model. They also proposed a ratio RSI , the transition rates entering E from S to the
transition rates exiting E to I , to differentiate rumor and real news events data. Isea and Lonngren
[58] extended the SEIZ model by modeling a forgetting rate of rumor posts. The forgetting rate
is defined as a probability a user forgets the rumors across all the states. Fig. 4c shows the key
components of the SEIZ model and its process with the states and rates given from one state to
another state.
Pros and Cons: Epidemic models provide a direct and straightforward mathematical model for
the diffusion dynamics of the false information. The agent density plot with time is a good way
of observing the differences between the simulation and real values. However, simulation tests
face a common issue as the population size is unknown and stable, and initial variable values are
unknown. If the population size is as large as the real social media network, the computational cost
cannot be ignored. In addition, in the SIR model, the state change is controlled by probability; but
this autonomous behavior ignores a user’s intentions and belief. To complement this, there have
been some efforts [19, 68] focusing on modeling and evaluating the effect of subjective, uncertain
opinion and trust of agents and the role of more agents in terms of false information diffusion.
5.3.2 Credibility-based Models. In OSNs, one of the methods detecting false information at-
tackers, Sybil accounts and spammers is modeling the credibility score in the network [63, 64, 167].
Existing works used various ways to represent the credibility score, such as reputation score, trust
score and belief score. Credibility in OSNs can be modeled by two methods: classification-based and
credibility propagation. A classification-based approach uses supervised learning algorithms [101].
On the other hand, the credibility propagation approach constructs a network to propagate credibility
values among users, tweet contents, events and activities [63]. Based on the credibility scores,
ranking algorithms of users and posts can be conducted such as PageRank [5, 18, 40, 167].
Negm et al. [101] used 5Ws (i.e., who, what, when, where, and why) credibility to distinguish
credible news and RSS files from news agencies to extract publication dates, headlines, contents,
and locations to feed into different algorithms to calculate the credibility of a news agency. The
algorithms they compared are Term FrequencyâĂŞInverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF), TF-IDF
with location, Latent Semantic Index (LSI), and TF with LSI and log entropy. They concluded
that TF-IDF and TF-IDF with location give the best results to calculate credibility. More recently,
Norambuena et al. [105] leveraged the 5W1H extraction and news summarization techniques to
propose the Inverted Pyramid Score (IPS) to distinguish structural differences between breaking
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and non-breaking news, with the long-term goal of contrasting reporting styles of mainstream and
non-mainstream fake outlets.
Jin et al. [63] have introduced a credibility propagation network for news content composed
of three layers: message, sub-event, and event. The event layer talks about the main event the
news covers, the sub-event layer relates events to the main event, and the message layer holds the
content of the news article. A graph optimization problem is formulated to calculate the credibility
in this hierarchical network. All the layers are content-based, and have direct relations with the
credibility of the news. Jin et al. [64] further proposed a verification method on credibility in a
propagation model by using a topic modeling technique. Mitra and Gilbert [96] constructed the
CREDBANK corpus by tracking tweets, topics, events, and associated in-situ human credibility
judgements to systematically study credibility of social media events tracked over real-time. They
later leveraged this corpus to construct language and temporal models for credibility assessment
[97, 98]. By identifying theoretically grounded linguistic dimensions, the authors presented a
parsimonious model that maps language cues to perceived levels of credibility. For example, hedge
words and positive emotion words were found to be associated with lower credibility. Additionally,
by examining the temporal dynamics of the event reportages, they found that the amount of
continued collective attention given to an event contain useful information about its associated
levels of credibility [97].
Akoglu et al. [4] proposed an OddBall algorithm to detect anomalous behavior like malicious
posts and fake donations. They studied a sub-graph (egonets) of a target node with its neighbors.
They analyzed various scoring and ranking methods by using feature patterns in density, weights,
principle eigenvalues, and ranks and compared their performance in different network topologies.
Kumar et al. [73] detected fake reviewers in user-to-item rating networks. They developed a new
trust system to rank users, products and ratings by fairness, goodness and reliability, respectively.
The intrinsic scores are calculated by combining network and behavior properties. Users have
ratings with low reliability are more likely to be fake reviewers [73]. Akoglu et al. [5] developed a
FraudEagle algorithm to spot fraudsters as well as fake reviews in online review platforms. There
are two steps in the FraudEagle algorithm, namely, scoring users and reviews and grouping the
analyzed results. For each review, the sentiment from true and false is only analyzed to assign the
belief score. The grouping step reviews top-ranked users in a subgraph by clustering and merging
more evidence to reveal fraudsters.
Ghosh et al. [40] developed a CollusionRank algorithm for detecting link farming type spammer
attacks. The influence scores were given to the users and web pages. By decreasing the influence
score of the users connected to spammers, the follow-back behavior of social capitalists was
discouraged. Yu et al. [167] developed a SybilLimit ranking algorithm for detecting Sybil attacks.
A Sybil node was identified by calculating the node’s trust score. Chirita et al. [18] developed a
MailRank algorithm for detecting Sybil attacks in the email network. A sender is assessed by a
global and personalized reputation score.
Pros and Cons: Credibility models can be applied in different stages and levels based on contents,
user behaviors, and posts/comments in highly heterogeneous networks. In addition, a credibility
model based on network features is agnostic to platforms and languages because the model only
needs network features. However, how to accurately evaluate initial credibility values is not a
trivial problem. Considering credibility at multiple levels makes the computation more complex
and expensive so it may not be preferred. Further, credibility may be subjective and cannot be
ported across platforms and/or networks. Lastly, a credibility model may not be able to detect
sudden changes caused by instances which are not easily observable, thus impacting the accuracy
of credibility score assessment.
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5.3.3 Cascades Features-based Models. Information network propagation patterns can be rep-
resented a cascading structure depicting the flow of OSD information flow that users time travelled
through, posted, tweeted, and retweeted. The cascading structure has two forms: hop-based cas-
cades and time-based cascades [173]. The cascades features can be grouped into two approaches: (i)
Calculating the similarity of cascades between true and false information; and (ii) Representing
cascades using informative representation and features in a supervised learning model.
Cascades Similarity. Cascades similarity is computed between fake news and true news. Graph
kernels [173] has been used as a common strategy for computing the cascades similarity. Wu et al.
[161] proposed a fake news detection method using a hybrid kernel function. This graph kernel
function calculates the similarity between different propagation trees. It also discussed about Radial
Basis Function (RBF) kernel which calculates the distance between two vectors of traditional and
semantic features. The sentiment and doubt scores for user posts need to be verified for fakes news.
Ma et al. [88] proposed a top-down tree structure using recursive neural networks (RNNs) for false
information detection. The RNN learns the representation from tweets content, such as embedding
various indicative signals hidden in the structure to improve rumors identification.
Cascades Representation. Cascades representation pursues informative representation as features
to distinguish fake news from true news. For example, the number of nodes is a feature in a non-
automated way. Alternatively cascades representation can fit deep learning models [163]. Wu and
Liu [163] used LSTM-RNN to model propagation cascades of a message. This work combines the
propagation pathways with user embedding, which forms a heterogeneous network. A message is
represented by a sequence of its spreaders. Modularity maximization algorithm is used to cluster
nodes with embedding vectors. Ma et al. [89] proposed propagation trees using Propagation Tree
Kernel (PTK) for rumor detection. It can explore the suggested feature space when calculating the
similarity between two objects.
Pros and Cons: Similarity-based approaches consider the roles users play in false information
propagation. Computing similarity between two cascades may require high computational com-
plexity [173]. Representation-based methods automatically represent news to be verified, but the
depth of cascades may challenge such methods as it is equal to the depth of the neural network.
All the approaches only provided experimental data to show their effectiveness. However, it may
not properly reflect real world settings. Training data is a time-consuming process and is often
computationally expensive.
5.3.4 Game Theoretic Models. This explores the deception and defense by reward and penalty
model in OSD attacks. In game theory, the actions and decisions of the players are mainly based on
the reward and penalty of their previous activities and the other players’ actions [143].
Kopp et al. [68] discussed a game theoretic false information propagation model as a deception
model that simulates the propagation of fake news in the OSNs. They used three types of game
theories: Greenberg’s deception model [43], Li and Cruz’s deception model [84], and hypergame
theory [11]. The Greenberg’s deception model investigated the effect of deception on players’
payoffs [43]. Kopp et al. [68] mapped false information to Greenberg’s false signal model. Li and
Cruz [84] used passive and active deception strategies by introducing noise and randomization,
respectively, to increase uncertainty. Kopp et al. [68] used the deception game in [84] for consistently
monitoring constraints and conditions, which affects game strategies. Bennett and Dando [11]
used hypergame theory to model a deception game where players have subjective perception and
understandings of a complicated game. Kopp et al. [68] also used [11] to consider players’ subjective
belief which may introduce uncertainty as well. The information theoretic model proposed by
Kopp et al. [68] found that attackers’ deceptive behavior can be significantly mitigated when the
cost of deception is fairly expensive.
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Pros and Cons: Game theoretic approaches to model OSD attacks add extra features over and
above other conventional network-structure based approaches by considering the cost and benefit
of performing a deceptive behavior by users in OSNs. Game theoretic deception detection is a
promising approach that reflects human behaviors aiming to take an optimal action based on the
expected outcome. However, game theoretic approaches have been rarely adopted in modeling and
analyzing online social deceptive behaviors when compared with data-driven deception detection
approaches. Due to this reason, the effectiveness of game theoretic deception detection approaches
has not been fully investigated in the literature. In addition, aligned with a conventional drawback
in using game theory, a large number of deceptive actions may introduce a high solution complexity.
In addition, uncertain, subjective beliefs of users should be carefully considered in terms of modeling
incomplete information and/or imperfect information in game theory.
5.3.5 Blockchain-based Models. Huckle and White [56] developed a tool called Proventor to
prove the origin of the media. The Proventor is based on Blockchain storing provenance metadata
for users to trust the authenticity of the metadata. Provenator can be used to validate news for news
outlets like CNN and BBC where information and news is sometimes gathered from independent
sources. However, since Provenator uses Blockchain and cryptography, a small difference, such as
one pixel difference between two images, can make the result vastly different, leading to generating
numerous false alarms and human intervention for validation, which is labor-intensive. In addition,
managing the large ledger size in Blockchain is an issue as shared information in social media
and news outlets grows exponentially. McEvily et al. [93] proposed a social media platform called
Steem (i.e., a database) based on Blockchain technology for building a community reward system.
The reward system relies on users for consensus voting, reading content, and commenting.
Pros and Cons: The original design of Blockchain has security benefits in terms of provenance,
integrity and immutability. The Blockchain system is a heterogeneous network that incorporate
other stakeholders to detect and control online social deception activities. In addition, it is resilient
against OSD attacks. However, since both flagging accuracy and consensus verification rely on
the contribution of crowd signals, it may break when too many users are malicious. For example,
if a high number of attackers contribute to the crowd activities and even control the system, a
user cannot access to write transactions. In addition, the authorized party may be compromised by
advanced attackers.
5.3.6 Other Network Optimization Models. Several graph optimization algorithms were pro-
posed in graph anomaly detection and community detection problems. Hu et al. [54] developed
a matrix factorization-based algorithm to detect social spammers on Twitter. Their framework
utilized both content information and network information of an adjacency matrix and solved
a non-smooth convex optimization problem. Several approaches have been taken to detect link
farming attacks via network structure-based algorithms. Araujo et al. [9] detected temporal com-
munities in cell networks and computer-traffic networks based on Tensor analysis. Jiang et al.
[60] detected behavior patterns in OSNs where the spectral subspaces have different patterns and
different lockstep behaviors. In addition, Jiang et al. [59] identified synchronized behaviors from
spammers. Kumar et al. [70] considered trolling as a social deception activity. They proposed a
decluttering algorithm to break a network into smaller networks on which the detection algorithm
can be run. Kumar et al. [72] considered sockpuppets as an OSD attack where users create multiple
identities to manipulate a discussion. They found that sockpuppets can be distinguished from
normal users by having more clustered egonets.
Pros and Cons: Graph-based features are more available compared to the user profile and/or
user interaction features without violating privacy issues. In addition, graph-based algorithms
can be agnostic to any datasets with high applicability in diverse platforms. However, collecting
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Fig. 5. Classification structure of our survey on OSD defense mechanisms. The types and subtypes of OSD
defense are illustrated in the tree structure. Under each of the method subtype, the OSD attack types are
summarized from the surveyed literature.
graph-based features, such as centrality measures, and solving graph optimization often require a
high computational cost. This hinders applicability to platforms that require real-time detection for
streaming data.
5.4 Hybrid Detection
Since ML/DL-based models can take an abundant amount of features, one can train a hybrid feature
set combining the user profile, message content, and network features to detect OSD attacks. Unlike
several existing survey papers which discussed only individual feature categories [69, 162], our
discussion will focus on dealing with OSD attacks using hybrid features [57, 79–81, 154, 157].
Lee et al. [81] detected crowdturfers from Twitter users. A total of 92 features were divided into
4 groups: User demographics, user friendship networks, user activity (behavior-based features),
and user content similarity including linguistic feature from LIWC dictionary. Vosoughi et al.
[154] developed a tool called Rumor Gauge for automatically verifying rumors and predicting
their veracity before they are verified by trusted channels. Since rumors are temporal, time-series
features are extracted as the rumor spreads. A total of 17 features (e.g., linguistics, user involved,
and propagation dynamics) were studied. They found that the fraction of low-to-high diffusion in
the diffusion graph is the most predictive feature to represent the veracity of rumors. The time-
series features are processed in DTW and HMM models but DTW assumes all the time-series are
independent and assigns equal weight to all 17 features. The experiment evaluated the performance
of the Rumor Gauge in terms of the accuracy of veracity prediction, contribution of each individual
feature, and contribution of three groups of features and accuracy as a function of latency.
ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: April 2020.
22 Zhen Guo, Jin-Hee Cho, Ing-Ray Chen, Srijan Sengupta, Michin Hong, and Tanushree Mitra
False Information Luring Fake Identity Crowdturfing Human Targeted Attacks
0
5
10 8
10
6
4
2
5
3
0 0 0
3
1 1 0 01
3 4
0 0
10 10
4
2
4
#
da
ta
se
t
Twitter
Sina Weibo
Facebook
Synthetic
Others
Fig. 6. Dataset counts for the four categories of deception: False Information, Luring, Fake Identity, Crowd-
turfing, and Human Targeted Attacks where each category has several dataset sources from Twitter, Sina
Weibo, Facebook, synthetic and other sources. The datasets are collected from all the approaches for the
prevention, detection, and mitigation of OSD attacks.
Pros and Cons: Hybrid detection takes advantages of hybrid feature sets and can improve the
accuracy in detecting rumors, spammers, and crowdturfings. A drawback is expensive feature engi-
neering and acquisition. Furthermore, the training process is time-consuming with the complexity
increasing as the feature size increases.
6 RESPONSE MECHANISMS TO ONLINE SOCIAL DECEPTION
In this section, we survey existing mitigation or recovery mechanisms after OSD attacks are de-
tected along with early detection mechanisms of OSD attacks [26, 37, 160]. Florêncio and Herley
[37] developed a mitigation strategy to deal with compromised accounts by detecting password
reuse events and timely reporting it to financial institutions. The aftermath actions are to take down
identified phishing sites, restore the compromised accounts, and rescue users from bad decisions.
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Fig. 7. Dataset count used in data-driven OSD detec-
tion techniques shown in Table A5 of the appendix
document and network structure based OSD detec-
tion techniques shown in Table A6 of the appendix
document: False Information, Luring, Fake Identity,
Crowdturfing, and Human-Targeted Attacks and each
category has several dataset sources from Twitter, Sina
Weibo, Facebook, synthetic and other sources.
Dinakar et al. [26] took a mitigation action
to counter cyberbullying with two steps: (i)
early detection; and (ii) reflective user inter-
faces that pop up notices and suggestions on
user behaviors. Most efforts made to mitigate
OSD attacks in OSNs mainly focused on reduc-
ing the effect of false information propagation.
Wu et al. [160] summarized two misinforma-
tion intervention methods: (i) detecting and
preventing misinformation from spreading in
an early stage; and (ii) developing a compet-
ing campaign to fight against misinformation.
To limit the spread of fake news, a sample of
fake news with maximal utility was identified
in [144]. Within a certain constraint, this sam-
ple of fake news kept the largest number of users away from fake news posts. Their algorithm
was robust against a high amount of spammers. Huckle and White [56] also made an effort to
mitigate fake news spread based the validity proof of digital media data, such as a picture in
the fake news. The blockchain technology was used to prove the origins of digital media data;
however, this method cannot prove the authenticity of the whole news article. Kumar and Shah
[69] summarized misinformation mitigation by modeling true and false information. From the
existing four different approaches, the authors concluded that these algorithms are effective in
detecting the spread of rumor and their simulations can suggest rumor mitigation strategies. Okada
et al. [109] studied rumor diffusion by an SIR-extended information diffusion model and developed
a mitigation mechanism to ask high influential users to spread correction diffusion. The authors
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examined how false rumor diffuses and converges when help and/or correct information is given
and how fast the convergence appears.
Pros and Cons: Mitigation and recovery mechanisms relied heavily on early detection. The
simulation model of spreading true information can mitigate the negative influence; but there is
a lack of real-world deployment. Recovery in OSNs is more difficult than offline social networks.
Only one research [37] designed a system for account restoration. More research efforts should be
made to effectively mitigate the aftermath after early detection.
Fig. 5 summarizes the classification of OSD defense mechanisms including prevention, detection,
and mitigation/response discussed in Sections 4, 5 and 6. Existing works mostly focused on detection
of OSD attacks we classified in Section 3. Less attention is paid to prevention and mitigation with the
focuses now mainly on false information, luring, and identity theft. There are still open questions
to build trustworthy cyberspace against human-targeted attacks, especially for protecting children.
7 VALIDATION & VERIFICATION
7.1 Datasets
We summarized all the datasets used in existingworks inOSDprevention and detection in Tables A4–
A5 of the appendix document. Most datasets are from large social media platforms, such as Twitter,
SinaWeibo, Facebook, Youtube, and Reddit. Twitter is the most frequently used data source probably
because of the user friendly API for public users to download tweets in a certain time period. Fig. 6
demonstrates the frequency distribution of each data source for four types of OSD attacks, namely,
False Information, Luring, Fake Identity, Crowdturfing, and Human Targeted Attacks. Twitter,
Weibo and Facebook platforms are drawn with synthetic datasets and datasets from all other
sources. Datasets for false information attacks (e.g., rumors, fake news and fake reviews) and
luring attacks (e.g., spamming and phishing) draw the most attention from researchers. Fig. 7
illustrates the dataset platforms distribution for two types of OSD attack detection approaches,
namely, data-driven detection and network structure-based detection. Twitter is still the preferable
data source. It demonstrates the diversity of the sources of datasets used in the literature.
7.1.1 Datasets for Data-Driven Approaches. Fig. 7 shows the distribution of datasets used in
data-driven approaches. Twitter datasets are broadly used in all types of OSD attack detection
mechanisms, such as spambot, malicious account, fake account, compromised account, rumors, and
crowdturfing. Other data sources include LinkedIn, YouTube, online forums Reddit, blacklisting
websites, fact-checking websites, crowdturfing worker sites, and PhishiTank websites, depending
on the type of OSD attacks. Several benchmark datasets are frequently used, such as a social
hoenypot dataset [80] in which the authors collected a lot of spammer accounts by using social
honeypots deployed in Twitter networks for seven months.
7.1.2 Datasets for Network-Structure Approaches. Fig. 7 also shows the dataset distribution
by sources in network structure-based detection. Twitter, Weibo, and Facebook are the top three
individual data sources. The others include fact-checking websites, app store database, online
forums, and rating platforms. The datasets for network structure-based approaches can be divided
into simulation research and detection research. Synthetic datasets are more frequently used in
simulation models, such as epidemic models and/or credibility/ranking-based models.
7.2 Metrics
Most data-driven approaches have used metrics to estimate the detection accuracy of OSD attacks.
The following metrics have been considered in the literature: confusion matrix, precision, recall,
F1 score or measure, accuracy, false positive rate (FPR), false negative rate (FNR), specificity,
weighted cost, receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, area under the curve (AUC), discounted
cumulative gain (DCG), Matthews correlation coefficient (MCC), Cohen’s Kappa Value (κ), mean
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absolute error (MAE), 2-norm error, mean fraction of recovered agents per time unit (R), Spearman’s
Rank correlation coefficient, label ranking average precision (LRAP), and label ranking loss (LRL).
Due to the space constraint, we discuss each of this metric in the appendix document (Section G).
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Fig. 8. Counts of research works by metrics.
Fig. 8 illustrates the counts of papers (i.e., how many
papers) that have used a particular group of metrics. Since
most of the current studies are to develop OSD attack de-
tection mechanisms, the majority of the metrics is related
to measuring detection accuracy. Among all the detec-
tion metrics, Precision, Recall, F1 score, Accuracy are the
most popular metrics used in the literature. FPR, FNR,
Specificity, ROC, and AUC are also obtained based on the
Confusion Matrix. They are used to compare the perfor-
mance of multiple classifiers. Algorithmic complexity of
defense algorithms is rarely considered.
8 ETHICAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL DECEPTION
Paradise et al. [115] discussed legal and ethics considerations of social honeypots and artificial
profiles. Dittrich [28] provided an overview of ethics of social honeypot combined with the use
of deception. Social and behavioral research falls into the type of human subject research that
is regulated by institutional review board (IRB). The authors discussed privacy issues in using
personal data, the use of deception in research, stackholder analysis, and ethical issues associated
with deception. They also showed a case study that three early social honeypot studies [45, 79, 175]
lacked the statement about issues of privacy, ethics, and IRB review. Elovici et al. [30] provided
guidelines for actions with ethical considerations. They investigated the privacy and security
concerns to obtain OSN data and the benefits to have reliable experimental research on OSNs.
Zhu [174] discussed their ethical considerations on Twitter suspended some fake accounts in
their hub account imitation study. They explained that their fake accounts are only for detecting
spammers. For some activities against Twitter rules [148], they limited their targets and posting
frequencies to minimize their negative effects. De Cristofaro et al. [23] also discussed ethics
considerations and justification in their data collection activity using Fackbook honeypot page
deployment. Yang et al. [164] brought up what if OSN normal operation is influenced by social
honeypot deployment. They justified their tweets by not sending malicious tweets with @mention
or URLs. Their actions only affect a few verified accounts and have little influences on other normal
users. Besides, Matwyshyn et al. [92] advocated that security vulnerability research for security
prevention and serving as social functions are neither unethical nor illegal.
There have been hot debates on legal and ethics considerations associated with developing
security tools to deal with OSD attacks. Since human users are the key part of OSNs and the key
entities to be protected in OSNs, we should be highly careful in developing defense tools against
OSD attacks while keeping user privacy intact as the first priority.
9 DISCUSSIONS: INSIGHTS & LIMITATIONS
Based on the extensive survey conducted, we identify the following insights:
• Deception domains and intent: Deception is defined across multidisciplinary domains with
varying intent and detectability in type and extent. Although social deception frequently is
considered a negative connotation with low integrity and maliciousness, not necessarily all
socially deceptive behaviors have bad intent. Rather, social deception can play a defensive social
role for self-protection or self-presentation.
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• OSD type category: Like online social network (OSN) attacks and cybercrimes, online social
deception (OSD) can be defined by deceptive intent. However, unlike OSN attacks or cybercrimes,
a unique aspect of the OSD is that OSD is only possible when a deceivee cooperates with a
deceiver. Hence, training and education of deceivees is critical for preventing OSD attacks.
• Important social deception cues: Traditional offline deception cues and vulnerabilities are
from several domains: individual, cultural, linguistic, physiological and psychological. The cues
and vulnerabilities of OSD have variations compared to face-to-face communication. For serious
OSD attacks which mainly belong to cybercrimes, such as human targeted attacks (e.g., human
trafficking, cyberbullying, cyberstalking, or cybergrooming), if OSD cues are effectively captured,
there is a much higher chance to prevent and detect online social deception than offline social
deception due to much less real-time interactions which trigger much less risky situations from
the safety perspective.
• Ethical design considerations of social honeypots: A social honeypot is one of broadly
studied OSD prevention/detection mechanism. They are deployed to passively collect attackers
account profiles. However, since social honeypots deal with human users, there should be careful
legal or ethical considerations in their design features.
• OSD detection mechanisms: Three dominant OSD detection approaches surveyed in this
work are user-profile-based, message content-based, and network structure-based. They each
have pros and cons in different scenarios. In particular, if a detection mechanism uses only
network structure features to detect OSD attacks, it would better preserve user privacy but need
to develop lightweight algorithms to efficiently calculate expensive network features, such as
centrality values requiring knowledge of the entire network topology and high computation cost
to estimate centrality values. To maximize the synergy of all three approaches, hybrid approaches
incorporating all are promising.
• Metrics for performance evaluation: As the majority of OSD defense mechanisms are ex-
plored to effectively detect OSD attacks, most works have used accuracy metrics to measure the
performance of their proposed work. A few of the metrics are based on correlations and ranks,
which are mainly used to identify key signals to detect OSD attacks.
We also found the following limitations of the existing OSD detection approaches:
• Lack of systematic, comprehensive defense strategies to combat OSD attacks: Fighting
against OSD attacks requires systematic, comprehensive, and active defense strategies covering
prevention, detection, and mitigation/response. However, existing approaches have been heavily
explored in detection strategies only. In addition, some approaches are embracing multiple roles
with a single mechanism. For example, most current OSD mitigation approaches are based on
the results from early detection. Further, since a social honeypot collects attacker profiles, the
analysis of social honeypots is used to design classifiers for both prevention and detection.
• Lack of experiments with real-time, dynamic datasets: Current prevention and detection
methods are based on simulation and/or real datasets, but only a few discussed effective training
and detection using streaming data, such as Twitter API. In addition, the high computational and
time complexity for real-time detection remains an open issue.
• Insufficient proactive defense: The inherent role of a social honeypot is proactively finding
targeted attackers (i.e., a particular type of attackers). This way allows a system to identify
targeted OSD attackers and proactively take actions to prevent potential victims by the targeted
OSD attackers, which may lead to cybercrimes. Although honeypots are used in communication
networks as a proactive intrusion prevention mechanism, social honeypots are passively used
in OSNs due to potential legal and ethical issues. Without clarifying the legal/ethical design
issues, the function and exploitation of social honeypots cannot be improved further to deal with
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highly intelligent attackers. In particular, to deal with real human-based OSD attacks, such as
crowdturfing by paid workers to conduct social deception activities, more active social honeypot
designs should be allowed while preserving normal user privacy and ethical rights.
• High complexity of features and models: We substantially surveyed the features for data-
driven detection methods in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 and network/epidemic models for network
structure feature-based methods in Section 5.3. The complexity of extracting/evaluating features
and the model optimization grows fast with the size of datasets. How to reduce the solution
complexity and improve solution efficiency for OSD detection is still an open issue.
• Lack of qualitative analysis for cues of OSD attacks: Most OSD defense mechanisms have
focused on dealing with attacks by machines (or bots). However, for more serious OSD attacks (i.e.,
human targeted attacks), appropriate cues should be first carefully identified through qualitative
analysis based on multidisciplinary research efforts with behavioral scientists.
10 CONCLUDING REMARKS
From the comprehensive survey conducted in this work, we obtained the key findings to answer
the research questions raised in Section 1.2 as follows:
• Answer toRQ1: The fundamental meanings and intent of social deception are commonly present
in both offline and online social deception as we find surprisingly common trends/characteristics
observed in socially deceptive behaviors. The common goal is ‘misleading a potential deceivee
for the benefit of a deceiver’ by increasing the deceivee’s misbelief or confusion. In both online
and offline platforms, social deception is successful only when the deceivee cooperates with
actions taken by the deceiver. Due to the unique characteristics of an online environment such as
less real-time/face-to-face interactions without physical presence to each other, both the deceivee
and deceivers can take advantages of them in terms of defense (i.e., prevention, detection, and
response/mitigation) and attack (e.g., anonymous attacks or easily running away if something
goes wrong).
• Answer to RQ2: More serious human targeted attacks (e.g., human trafficking, cyberstalking,
cybergrooming, or cyberbullying) have emerged as new OSD attack types. The seriousness has
grown as online deception often leads to offline crimes, which become indeed the major concern
of cybercrimes. While human targeted attacks become a more serious social issue, there is a lack
of cyber laws to respond to this serious social deception attack, easily leading to cybercrimes.
• Answer to RQ3: Many cues and susceptability traits of offline social deception behaviors are
present in online social deception behaviors. The examples include intentionality of social decep-
tion, its cues from linguistic, cultural, and/or technological contexts, and various susceptibility
factors including demographics, cultural, and/or network structure feature-based traits. Moreover,
due to the limited real-time and/or interactions feeling people’s presence in online platforms,
some cues such as physiological and/or psychological cues may be missed while they can be
highly useful cues for detecting social deception. However, as more advanced features of online
platform-based interactions emerge, more physiological/psychological cues can be captured to
improve deception detection (e.g., heart beats can be fed back to a detection mechanism).
• Answer to RQ4: Most defense mechanisms to combat OSD attacks only focused on detection,
particularly in terms of data-driven approaches using machine/deep learning techniques. Preven-
tion mechanisms are substantially limited and have often been considered along with detection
mechanisms (e.g., social honeypots or data-driven approaches). Response mechanisms after the
detection of the OSD are even much less explored than prevention mechanisms.
• Answer to RQ5: Popular datasets used in existing OSD research are from Twitter, Sina Weibo,
and Facebook along with other synthetic datasets collected from simulation, as shown in Figs. 6
and 7. In particular, to study human targeted attacks, there is a lack of datasets available because
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online human targeted deception data are based on individual chats or dyadic interactions.
In addition, most metrics are to measure detection accuracy of OSD attacks, which is natural
to observe as most defense mechanisms mainly focus on detection. Hence, there is a lack of
efficiency metrics that can capture cost / complexity of the proposed defense techniques against
OSD attacks.
• Answer to RQ6: The OSD research is inherently involved with human users and may introduce
ethical issues. However, to conduct meaningful experiments, some real testbed-based valida-
tion/verification should be conducted to obtain high confidence in the developed technologies
under realistic settings. However, when deploying defense techniques in a real testbed (e.g.,
Facebook, Twitter, etc), the defense process may encounter inevitable deception towards normal,
legitimate users. In addition, privacy is a big concern in cybersecurity and there is an inherent
tradeoff between preserving users privacy and improving the quality of defense tools against OSD
attacks. To investigate serious OSD attacks, such as human targeted attacks, most interactions
are peer-to-peer, such as dyadic conversations/chats, which is mostly unavailable. As a result,
there is a lack of real datasets in studying highly serious human targeted attacks, such as human
trafficking, cyberstalking, or cybergrooming attacks. Also, there is a lack of systematic legal
and/or ethical logistics on how to proceed the OSD research with involvement of human users in
real testbed settings.
We suggest the following future research directions in the online social deception and its
countermeasure research:
• Development of defense applications against online social deception considering mul-
tidimensional concepts of social deception: Although various concepts, properties, and cues
of social deception have been studied in diverse disciplines, the multidisciplinary nature of social
deception has not been appropriately considered in developing defense mechanisms against
online social deception (OSD) attacks. In particular, deceivers and deceivees are both humans via
online platforms. Without understanding the way deceivers and deceivees communicate and/or
interact to each other, it is hard to detect deception easily. Deception can be easily deployed
on top of firm, trust relationships. In order to distinguish deception from truthfulness, in-depth
understanding of deception based on multidisciplinary research effort is a must for developing
effective defense mechanisms against OSD attacks.
• Distinction of benign deception from malicious deception: In the cybersecurity domain,
deception refers to a deceptive action with malicious intent. However, in a social network, many
users may use OSD to promote self-presentation/protection for privacy protection. Therefore, if
OSD is treated as a form of attacks, it can possibly result in a high false positive rate (i.e., detecting
benign users as malicious users). In order to prevent this, deception-specific online defense tools
that can differentiate benign deception from malicious deception should be developed.
• Culture-aware defense against OSD attacks: Based on our survey, different cultural decep-
tion cues have been observed [13, 53, 83, 130]. Since deception cues are sensitive to cultural
characteristics, culture-aware defense mechanisms should be developed to effectively deal with
OSD attacks that consider unique cultural characteristics of a social network.
• Detectability-aware and intent-aware defense against OSD attacks: As discussed in Fig. A2
of the appendix document, the spectrum of deception can span a wide range based on the extent of
detectability and intent. Intelligent OSD attackers may establish trust relationships with potential
victims and exploit the established trust to deceive the victims. This is especially observed in
human targeted attacks such as human trafficking or cybergrooming, which is categorized as a
serious cybercrime [168]. Hence, developing detectability-aware and intent-aware cues against
highly subtle hard-to-detect OSD attacks is a future research direction.
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• Security protection of adolescent online users in multiple roles: Adolescents have high
vulnerability to OSD attacks, as discussed in Section F of the appendix document. Deceptions
such as cyberbullying have exposed severe social, behavioral and security issues introduced due
to collaboration in multiple roles by adolescents. Educational and habitual guidelines, parental
control, and/or security guard tools cannot protect potential deceivees. Social media platforms
need to enhance their effective OSD prevention mechanisms especially for young users.
• Dynamic, updated defense mechanisms to obfuscate highly advanced attackers: Recent
studies showed that OSD attackers can build advanced social bots by analyzing the current
detection models and fooling the existing models by leveraging adversarial machine learning
(AML) techniques [74]. One countermeasure is to collect new datasets and retrain the classifiers.
However, it is challenging to support updating the models with additional datasets. The cost of
repeatedly training the classifiers with the whole dataset is particularly high. Another method is
to identify unknown deception features based on linguistic, behavioral, and technological cues.
• Defense against human attackers vs. social bots: Human attackers are another type of ad-
vanced attackers where a real human is behind the social network platforms performing OSD
attacks. They can bypass detection because the conversation is from real humans or the accounts
are mimicking normal users. There also exist crowdturfing workers who spread deceptive infor-
mation in social media and get paid. More research work is needed to investigate how to detect
and differentiate social bots from human attackers.
• Measurement of physiological and/or psychological cues to develop better prevention
techniques against OSD attacks: Due to the unique characteristics of online platforms, some
critical deception cues are missing and must be identified first, such as physiological and/or
psychological cues. Measuring those cues can be critical in terms of improving prevention and
early detection against OSD attacks.
• More efforts are needed to explore prevention and response mechanisms to defend
against OSD attacks: In terms of the techniques used across all defense mechanisms, while
machine/deep learning approaches are popularly used, game theoretic and/or network structure
feature based approaches are still to be further explored to produce more mature approaches.
They have extra merits over data-driven approaches in that the game theoretic approach can
predict an attacker’s next move. For prevention, although early detection as an OSD prevention
strategy is receiving a high attention with growing amounts of recent works to fight against OSD
attacks, there should be more prevention mechanisms that can provide more proactive defense
such as identifying potential attacks even before the attacks occur. Response/mitigation after
OSD detection, such as mitigation after false information spread or recovery after OSD attacks
are launched, is little explored in the literature and calls for more efforts to further investigate
effective mechanisms to minimize risk and aftermath effect after OSD detection.
• Effective deception cues are needed to combat OSD attacks without violating user pri-
vacy: Due to a lack of effective deception cues/datasets, it is difficult to conduct OSD research
to defend against serious human targeted OSD attacks for validation and verification. A future
direction is to develop techniques to capture clear deception cues without violating user privacy.
• More efficiency metrics are needed to expedite the defense process: Efficiency metrics
for measuring algorithmic complexity of defense techniques have not been sufficiently used in
existing approaches. More meaningful complexity/efficiency metrics should be considered in
order to expedite the speed of prevention, detection, and recovery as a defense against OSD.
• Systematic legal and/or ethical guidelines are needed for conducting meaningful OSD
research: Since humans are the key factors in solving the problems associated with the OSD
attacks, the research community and government need to provide clear guidelines on conducting
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OSD research without violating user privacy. In communication networks, the research commu-
nity appears to have reached some accord about using defensive deception techniques to defend
against cyberattacks by emphasizing its benefits. However, for cybersecurity research on OSN
platforms likely involving human subjects, there is little research, let along a consensus, on what
methodologies are allowed and what level of user privacy must be preserved before achieving
the goal of defense effectiveness.
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Table A3. Goal, intent, and security breach according to a different type of social deception.
Goal of social deception Malicious vs. Non-malicious intent Breach of security goals
Parasitism Malicious Loss of integrity
Cooperative deception Malicious Loss of integrity
Privacy protection Non-malicious Loss of confidentiality
Self-presentation Non-malicious Loss of integrity
Self-deception Non-malicious Loss of integrity
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A COMPARISONWITH EXISTING SURVEY PAPERS
In this section, we provide more detailed discussion on each of the existing survey papers in Section
1.3 of the main paper.
Fire et al. [51] mainly discussed social network threats targeted at young children in terms of
phishing, spamming, fake identity, profile cloning attacks, cyberbullying, and cyber-grooming.
Rathore et al. [131] surveyed social network attacks with a special emphasis on multi-media security
and privacy. Since fake news is an emerging deception attack in OSNs, a recent effort by Kumar and
Shah [87] discussed the details of fake news detection methods. Although the existing works stated
above [51, 87, 131] proposed mechanisms to mitigate specific social deception threats, they focused
on discussing prevention methods and practical security suggestions. An interesting observation is
that no work has discussed ethical issues in developing techniques to deal with OSN threats/attacks.
Besides, we observed a lack of understanding on the pros and cons of each detection or mitigation
technique that combat online social deception attacks.
Rathore et al. [131] conducted a comprehensive survey on social network security. They classified
social network security threats in three categories, including multimedia content threats, traditional
threats, and social threats with 21 types of threats/attacks. The authors mainly discussed multimedia
content threats, along with their definitions, impact, and security response methods, including
detection methods for each type of threat. They also compared various security attacks in terms of
the nature of attack (attack source), attack difficulty, risk to data privacy/integrity, and attack impact
on users. In the end, they proposed a framework to measure and optimize the security of social
network services (SNSs). Gao et al. [54] discussed the four types of social network attacks, which
include privacy breaches, viral marketing attacks, network structural attacks, and malware attacks.
The authors compared various attacks, including information leak, de-anonymizing, phishing, Sybil,
malware, and spamming, and discussed countermeasure defense mechanisms against them.
Novak and Li [119] focused on OSN security and data privacy issues. They discussed how to
protect user data from attacks, social network inference (e.g., user attributes, location hubs, and
link prediction) and the research in anonymizing social network data. Kayes and Iamnitchi [83]
reviewed the taxonomies of privacy and security attacks and their solutions in OSNs. The authors
categorized the attacks based on OSN’s stakeholders (on users and their OSNs) and entities (i.e.,
human, computer programs, or organizations) performing the attacks. They discussed attacks on
users’ information and how to counter leakages and linkages. However, the attacks discussed as
social deception are common social network attacks, such as Sybil attacks, compromised accounts
and/or spams. The defense techniques to mitigate each attack type were discussed as ways to detect
and resist against those attacks.
Fire et al. [51] discussed key OSN threats and solutions against them. The authors outlined OSN
threats based on the four groups with an additional focus on attacks against children and teenagers.
The threats are 5 classic threats, 9 modern threats, combination threats and 3 threats targeting
children. The discussed defense solutions were techniques provided by OSN operators, commercial
companies, and academic researchers and discussed the protection ability of various solutions. In
the end, they provided recommendations for OSN users to protect their security and privacy when
using social networks. Kumar and Shah [87] discussed the characteristics and detection of false
information on Web and social media, with two knowledge-based types: opinion-based methods
with ground truth (e.g., fake reviews), and fact-based methods without ground truth (e.g., hoaxes
and rumors). They described how false information can perform successful deception attacks,
and their impacts on the speed of false information propagation and characteristics for each type.
Based on the specific characteristics, the authors discussed the detection algorithms for each type
utilizing different features and propagation models in terms of the analysis of classification, key
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actors, impacts, features, and measurements. In addition, they discussed the detection algorithms
for opinion-based and fact-based detection mechanisms, respectively.
Wu et al. [181] summarized misinformation in social media, focusing more on the unintentional-
spread misinformation, such as meme, spam, rumors, and fake news. It discussed information
diffusion models and network structure, misinformation detection and spreader detection, mis-
information intervention, and detailed evaluation datasets and metrics. The diffusion models are
SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered/Removed), Tipping Point, Independent Cascade, and Linear
Threshold model. In the diffusion process, user types can be categorized as forceful individuals [2],
which refer to users not affected upon belief exchange. Wu and Liu [183] described detecting
crowdturfing in social media. The authors summarized the history of astroturfing campaign and
crowdturfing. The methods to investigate crowdturfing is mining and profiling social media users
as attackers and modeling information diffusion in social media. Finally, crowdturfing detection
can be performed in content-based, behavior-based, and diffusion-based approaches in the state-of-
the-art research. However, this work [183] limited its scope only to crowdturfing. Hence, we didn’t
include it for the comparison of our survey paper with other counterpart survey papers. Tsikerdekis
and Zeadally [160] analyzed the motivations and techniques of online deception in social media
platforms. They categorized social media by the extent of media richness and self-disclosure. Due
to the user connection and content sharing nature of social media, online deception techniques can
involve multiple roles, such as content, sender, and communication channel. They also provided an
insightful discussion of challenges in prevention and detection of online deception. However, this
work didn’t discuss any attack behaviors concerned as in our paper.
B MULTIDISCIPLINARY CONCEPTS OF DECEPTION
B.1 Philosophy
Many philosophers raised issues towards the general definition of deception which can happen
mistakenly or intentionally. Some philosophers admitted the possibility of ‘inadvertent or mistaken
deceiving’ [18]; however, others disagreed with it and emphasized the aspect of ‘misleading a belief’
by either inadvertently or mistakenly [55, 136]. In addition, as the distinction between ‘lying’ and
‘deceiving,’ ‘deceiving’ must go with the achievement or success by the act of deceiving, such as a
‘false belief’ [107]. The core aspects of deception in Philosophy lies in an intentional act to mislead
an entity to believe a false belief.
B.2 Behavioral Science
Behavior scientists 1 investigated the concept of deception and its process in the behaviors of animals
and/or humans. Two main concepts of deception are: (1) Functional deception for an individual’s
behavior (i.e., a signal) to mislead the actions of others; and (2) intentional deception referring to
intentional states, such as beliefs and/or desires, guide an individual’s behavior, leading to the
misrepresentation of belief states [67]. The common deception study in this field is investigating
the effect of lying or deception on memory and/or the part of a brain activated, associated with the
concept of functional deception [93, 150].
B.3 Psychology
Psychologists defined deception as a behavior providing information to mislead subjects to some
direction [3] or explicit misrepresentation of a fact aiming to mislead subjects [73, 117]. The major
psychological deception study focused on identifying cues as committing a crime [58], psychological
symptoms for self-deception [19, 69], individual differences and/or cues to deception [133], verbal
or non-verbal communication cues [196].
1We consider biologists, ecologists, neuroscientists, and medical scientists as ‘behavioral scientists’ in this work.
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B.4 Sociology
Since 1970’s, deception has been studied as a distinct human ability due to intentionality, use of
language, and self-awareness [92]; however, since the 1980’s, deceptive behaviors were observed
among animals and have been studied by comparing human and non-human deceptive behaviors in
terms of their unique characteristics [111, 112]. Sociological deception research has mainly studied
the effect of deception in various social context on both positive and negative aspects [111], or
deception as a relational, or marketing strategy [128].
B.5 Public Relations
In this domain, the concept of self-deception has been studied as a strategic solution to resolve
internal or external crisis [143]. The external role of self-deception is described as a way to avoid
disastrous impact on an organization [122] by attributing a problem (or guilty) to an individual or
victim. This is called ‘parasitism’ forming a false belief towards the victim for responsibilities. In this
domain, deception is mainly studied as a strategy to deal with conflicts in public (or international)
relations [70] or the relationships between public practitioners and journalists [28, 100].
B.6 Communications or Linguistics
In this domain, deception research often aimed to identify either verbal or non-verbal indicators for
deceptive communications. Interpersonal deception theory (IDT) views deception as an interactive
process between senders and receivers, exchanging non-verbal and verbal behaviors and interpret-
ing their communicative meanings. IDT further explains that deceivers strategically manage their
verbal communications to successfully deceive receivers [14, 15]. Experimental studies showed that
deceivers produced more words, fewer self-oriented (e.g., I, me, my) and more sense-based words
(e.g., seeing, touching) than truth-tellers [66]. As computer-mediated systems have been popularly
used, systems for automated linguistics-based cues to deception have been developed considering
text-based asynchronous communications [193].
B.7 Command and Control
In the military domain, deception refers to any planned maneuvers undertaken for revealing false
information and hiding the truth to an enemywith the purpose of misleading the enemy and enticing
the enemy to undertake the wrong operations [30, 112, 175]. The theory of military deception is to
spread the deceived messages to the enemy masses through many channels and finally deceive the
enemy’s nerve centers and decision makers, which is to the opposite of psychological warfare [112].
Military deception is used as a strategy and the strategic levels of political and military interaction
are higher than the tactical level [30, 134].
B.8 Computing and Engineering
In this domain, deception has been employed by both attackers and defenders. Deceptive behaviors
have popularly exhibited by cyber attackers in various forms, such as phishing, social engineering
attacks, fraud advertisements, stealthy attack, and so forth [68, 131]. On the other hand, by leverag-
ing the concept of deception, various types of defensive deception techniques have been proposed.
Almeshekah and Spafford [7] enhanced the definition of cyberdeception by Yuill [191] as “planned
actions taken to mislead and/or confuse attackers and to thereby cause them to take (or not take)
specific actions that aid computer-security defenses.” A common idea lies in that deception is a
way to cause an entity to form false beliefs [135]. Hence, successful deception leads a deceivee to
respond suboptimally, which benefits the deceiver. Han et al. [65] conducted an extensive survey
on defensive deception techniques, in terms of classification, current applications, modeling, and
deployment techniques aiming to solve cybersecurity problems. In this work, we study deception
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from an attacker’s perspective as part of OSN attacks. Table A1 summarizes the meaning and goal
of deception studied in different disciplines.
C TYPE, DESCRIPTION, AND INTENT OF ONLINE SOCIAL DECEPTION ATTACKS
See Table A2.
D CUES OF SOCIAL DECEPTION
Since many cues predicting offline social deception have been discussed, we discuss them in this
section in order to link the cues of offline social deception and those of online social deception. We
discuss deception cues in terms of individual, cultural, linguistic, physiological, psychological, and
technological traits below. From this discussion, we aim to deliver insights on how the estimates of
those deception cues can provide the key predictors of detecting online social deception.
D.1 Individual Deception Cues
Riggo and Friedman [133] studied correlations between individual types and behavioral patterns
and found individuals vary systematically in displaying certain behavioral cues (e.g., dominance, a
social skills measure) are correlated with facial animation behavior. Certain types of individuals
can control the display of cues to increase the likelihood of deception. For example, dominant,
extroverted, and exhibitionistic individuals tend to restrain the display of nervous behaviors while
deceiving others. In addition, a significant relationship is found between exhibitionistic personality
(e.g., a good actor-like personality) and successful deception ability in different experimental
settings. In the correlation study of personality and deception ability, they also found that males
appear to be good liars especially when their faces can be seen by the victims [133]. Kraut and Poe
[86] studied demographic characteristics and behaviors as deception cues for custom inspectors.
They found that the occupational status and age were the top predictors.
D.2 Cultural Deception Cues
Cultural variations are used to explain deception cues in the literature. Lewis and George [101]
showed that individuals from collectivistic cultures were more apt to employ deception in business
negotiation than those from individualistic cultures. Heine [69] discussed self-enhancement in
Western people where self-enhancement refers to a motivation that can make a person feel positive
about himself/herself with a high self-esteem [142]. They found that East Asians have different
motivations and effects because of the cultural variations. Bond et al. [13] had an experiment of
cultural influences to a set of deception behaviors using Jordanians and Americans as subjects. The
results showed in the lying settings, Jordanians displayed more behavioral cues than Americans in
terms of eye contact and filled pauses.
D.3 Linguistic Deception Cues
Linguistic and/or communicative cues exhibiting deception in communications have been studied.
Linguistic profiles are studied in deceptive communication, choice and use of languages, and
linguistic patterns in deceptive messages [14, 15]. The following four categories of linguistic
deception cues have been discussed:
• Word quantity [66, 115]: This cue was found inconsistently across studies. The fewer or more
quantities depended on what were examined. In deceptive dyadic communications in an online
synchronous text-based setting, the experiments showed that deceptive communication produced
more words.
• Pronoun use [155]: Deceptive communication used fewer of first-person singular, and more of
third-person pronouns.
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• Emotion words [130]: More sense-based words (e.g., seeing, touching, smelling, feeling) were
found in deceptive communications.
• Markers of cognitive complexity [66, 115, 130, 168]: Describing what was done requires much more
complex cognitive process than describing what was not done [130]. In this sense, deception is
associated with language requiring lower cognitive complexity. Deception uses fewer distinction
markers, such as exclusive words, negations (e.g., no, never, or but, except, either, not) [66, 115].
Using exclusive words requires the person to distinguish what is in a category from what is not.
D.4 Physiological Deception Cues
Physiological or behavioral cues are the emotions in deceiving that liars are expressing because
they are indicators of guilt [34]. In the studies of behavioral cues to deception [34] and physiological
cues to identifying deception [168], liars may have at least one of emotions, content complexity,
and attempted control phenomena. The behavioral cues have the following categories:
• Less blink [168, 169]: The strongest evidence of behavioral change in deception is a decrease
in eye blinking. Wallbott and Scherer [171] showed that increased cognitive load rather than
nervousness results in a decrease in eye blinking.
• Higher-pitched voices and faster speech [34]: A natural outcome of suppressing behaviors is to be
more rigid. An example of behavioral failure is to regulate expressive behaviors, such as a voice
tone but result in higher tones.
• Displacement activities [157]: Displacement activities consist of most self-directed behaviors in
situations with high social tension. Increased displacement behavior correlates with a subject’s
anxiety and conscious deception.
• Irrelevant activities [169]: These symptoms include decreased hand and finger movements for
males and tensing up the body because lying is a cognitive demanding to prevent the conflicts
and disagreement of lies.
D.5 Psychological Deception Cues
Psychological or cognitive cues include nonverbal anxiety responses that are consciously revealed
in the intentional deception [84]. Mitchell [112] described the mental process of deceptions from
a social cognitive perspective based on children verbal deception and nonverbal deception in
sports. Knapp et al. [84] used controlled lab settings to determine the characteristics of intentional
deception with verbal and nonverbal cues. They revealed the following psychological cues:
• Cognitive load [156, 168, 169]: This is the most important deception cue [156]. Self-deception is
effective to hide the deception and reduce its immediate cognitive costs. The innovative deception
detection is a cognitive-load approach [169], which focused more on the cues of ‘thinking-hard’
rather than attending to the behavioral cues of liars, assuming that lying is cognitive demanding.
In practice, the interview strategy can be improved by increasing the interviewees’ cognitive
demand from a parallel task.
• Nervousness [34, 156, 168]: Nervousness arises from a mixture of emotions of guilty, fear of
being caught and excitement [168]. Nervousness is regarded as a weak indicator of predicting
deception [156]. The cues of nervousness are gaze aversion and fidgeting but Vrij [168] argued
they are not always related to deception in situations of low severity negative consequences
of being caught. They further pointed out that nervousness could be decreased if the frequent
suspects were familiar with the police interviews.
• Control [156, 168]: In order to avoid the signs of deceiving and suppress the nervous behaviors,
deceivers tend to exert control to obtain an impression of being an honest person [156]. There
are two possible unexpected consequences of attempted control. One could be inadequate control
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of behavior [168], which is another cue of deception and the other is ‘overcontrol’ [156], which
is a side effect of impression of planned and rehearsed behaviors. Physiological cues are very
closely related to psychological cues, for example, as control also shows displacement activities
(e.g., exhibiting inappropriate behavior upon confusion or conflict).
Trivers [156] emphasized nervousness, control and cognitive load as three key deception cues. In
addition, other anxiety responses are discussed [84]. Deceivers tend to exhibit cognitive cues, such
as more uncertainty, vagueness, nervousness, reticence, dependence, and/or unpleasantness as a
negative effect.
D.6 Technological Deception Cues
Ferrara et al. [49] discussed the impact and detection of social bots which are the outcome of
abusing new technologies. Social bots with malicious intents caused several levels of damage to
society. Early bots mainly automatically posted content and can be spotted by the cues of a high
volume of content generation. Several social honeypot studies attracted social bots followers by
carefully designed bots and analyzed the technology cues of social bots. However, sophisticated
social bots are becoming more intelligent and tend to mimic human-like behaviors, making it
hard to detect the social bots. The advanced detection strategy leveraged the technological cues
from social graph structure, such as densely connected communities, and behavioral patterns. The
proposed behavioral signature contains classes of features including network, user, friends, timing,
content, and sentiment [49].
D.7 Relationships Between Deception Cues of Offline and Online Platforms
Fig. A1 summarizes the key social deception cues discussed so far. Via the in-depth survey of
deception cues, we identified the commonalities and differences between online and offline deceptive
behaviors as below.
D.7.1 Commonalities betweenOnline andOffline Deceptive Behaviors. Deception usually
spreads via communication between deceivers and deceivees. The online media platforms support
chat-based communications and even synchronous similar to the traditional face-to-face chatting
or interviews [160]. Interpersonal deception theory [15] discusses several verbal and non-verbal
deception cues for traditional offline communications. Most of the verbal deception cues (e.g.,
linguistic cues) are relevant to both offline and online deception [35]. Messages and posts are
the main source of online information so that the linguistic cues are most useful cues for online
deception [192]. These days online platforms also provide face-to-face chatting. Although it is
limited to some extent, some physiological cues and/or body movement can be captured.
D.7.2 Differences between Online and Offline Deceptive Behaviors. Although face-to-face
social media platforms make people feel much closer to each other by delivering body movement
and/or facial expressions, feeling some physiological cues and/or subtle behavioral changes may not
be captured like face-to-face interactions [160]. In addition, typing behavior, including response time
and the number of edits, for online chatting were studied as typing cues of online deception [35],
which is not often observed in offline interactions. In addition, online behaviors are known different
from offline behaviors in their motivations and attitudes [32]. In this sense, more research should
be done to identify unique cues of online human deceptive behaviors.
E TYPES OF DECEPTION AND RELATED TAXONOMIES
E.1 Types of Deception
In this section, we first categorize deception based on intentionality to explain whether a deceiver
has an intent to deceive a target deceivee or not. Intentional deception [43] can be further classified
into malicious deception and non-malicious deception.
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E.1.1 Intentional Deception. This deception consists of deception with malicious intent and
with non-malicious intent for a deceiver’s interest.
The goals of malicious deception can be as follows:
• Financial benefit: Many deceptive behaviors has its purpose to obtain a monetary benefit. Corpo-
rate deception may have financial benefits in a short term. Englehardt and Evans [43] described
a fortune 500 company covered the cheating of huge expenses from one of its senior executives.
Another example is a deceptive advertising, such as the advertising from Volkswagen’s 2015
emission scandal [143]. For the financial benefits, Volkswagen deceived the consumers in its sus-
tainability reports in 2013 and 2014. Financial benefit is also a common reason of an individual’s
online deceptive behavior. For example, a spammer can be paid from clicking advertisements by
attracting online traffic to the specific sites [116]. Malicious users spread phishing links during a
holiday period to collect payment details from victims [164].
• Manipulation of public opinions: In social media, social and political bots play a role in influencing
public opinions [53]. Malicious bots spread spam and phishing links. Politicians and governments
worldwide have been using such bots to manipulate public opinions. For example, Forelle et al.
[53] reported that most active bots are those used by Venezuela’s radical opposition.
• Self-deception: Self-deception is part of a unconscious self-deception process. The cost of lying is
heavy so liars need to pay heavy cognitive costs to maintain the consistence of the lies to avoid
any imperfections. The cognitive costs of conscious deception is higher than the unconscious
deception [156]. Self-deception is part of an unconscious process which can reduce the immediate
cognitive costs of deception and prevent showing nonverbal cues of guilt [19]. Lies covered up
by self-deception are harder to be detected.
• Cooperative deception: Cooperation is a strategy of balancing costs and benefits and maintaining
stakeholder relationships in the deception or cooperation interactions with opponents [156],
often used in public relations. The research [20, 28] reported this relationship between public
relations practitioners and journalists in a crisis communication experiment and studied how
deception plays a role. In this deception, victims often willingly contribute to successful deception
by ignoring the evidence against false information or by convincing themselves that deception
does not exist [112].
• Parasitism [143]: This refers to ‘false framing of responsibility’ which can be easily used as a
strategy to solve complicated issues without introducing long-term investigations that may
cause structural changes. As discussed earlier in the concept of deception in public relations,
parasitism is used as a strategy to create a false belief towards the victim for a deceiver to avoid
any consequence of a certain conflict.
The goals of non-malicious deception are commonly discussed as follows:
• Privacy protection: Deception can be used as a defense for the privacy protection at the organization-
level or individual-level. The organization-level refers to the protection of internal information
and control of information flow. This is also called defensive deception. There are a few methods
for the individual-level privacy protection in cyberspace. Some privacy techniques add a noise
to a user’s data for protection against attackers [129] because the data can be modified before
being published. Another defensive deception is to hide a user by using outside users. Using mix
networks for anonymity is an example for messages privacy protection [129].
• Self-presentation: People use fake presentation to present themselves as certain roles or in-
tents [139]. Self-presentation is an activity to impress others for both liars and truth tellers.
Self-presentation is one way of understanding nonverbal communication [34]. Deceptive self-
presentation can make people more reliable or protect themselves from getting hurt by disagree-
ments. Self-presentation can be used as prediction cues to deception [34].
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• Self-deception: This is to hide true information reflecting conscious mind unconsciously [156],
with the two main benefits of not being detected easily and reducing immediate cognitive costs.
Chance and Norton [19] discussed a social benefit of self-deceptive confidence, leading to higher
social status [91]. In addition, Chance and Norton [19] examined psychological benefits of self-
deception in terms of optimistic opinions and/or high motivations towards themselves and other
people. In addition, self-deception is also used as strategies to deal with public relations [143] to
resolve conflict situations.
E.1.2 Unintentional Deception. This type of deception is usually used without explicit intent.
One can use deception without certain intent mistakenly or unconsciously. This deception is
understood as an action with the following reasons:
• Lack of knowledge on fact: A false belief can be conveyed by unintentional half-truths, such as
exaggerations, omissions or obscured information [143]. In this situation, deception is caused by
a lack of full knowledge. Deception includes both verbal form (e.g., lying to lure a deceivee or
hide truth) and non-verbal forms (e.g., hiding information such as secrecy) for misleading the
deceivee’s belief/action via biased information processing [110].
• Following social norms or rules: Deception can be driven by the need of fake conformity by
adjusting internal regulations complying with external social norms expectations (e.g., submissive
attitudes are preferred in some Asian cultures). Inside the organization, actions caused by either
individuals or groups should follow the external social norm expectations [143].
• Resolving cognitive dissonance by using self-deception: Self-deception can imply an unintentional
state of mind, potentially resulting in motivational bias [109], thereby contributing to errors in
behavioral judgements or decisions [114]. Self-deception hides facts in the unconscious mind in
order to solve the conflicts of truth and people’s internal beliefs [156]. Individuals tend to use
self-deception to cope with cognitive dissonance in their mind [143].
E.2 Taxonomies and Spectrum of Deception
This section discusses the related concepts and spectrum of deception. Deception can be defined
and explained by a set of related terminologies in which those concepts should be defined and
compared. Deception exists in our daily life in both verbal and nonverbal forms. Deception ranges
a wide spectrum with varying intent and detectability (i.e., the extent of deception being detected).
E.2.1 Key Taxonomies of Deception. Here are the concepts related to deception in social
sciences. Each of them has a specific meaning and represents some properties of deception. Most
common concepts are defined in the dictionary and discussed in the cybersecurity literature [19,
34, 36, 135, 143].
• Deceivee [135]: The victim of a deception.
• Deceiver [135]: The perpetrator of a deception.
• Susceptibility [36]: Likelihood to be deceived.
• Exploitation [36]: The use of resources and benefit from them (e.g., damage to systems) by
attackers.
• Self-deception [19]: A conscious false belief held with a conflicting unconscious true belief.
• Trust [36]: Reliance on the confidentiality and integrity from other sources and with confidence.
Earning high trust from a deceivee can be easily exploited by a deceiver.
• Lying [34, 135]: Deliberate verbal deceptions. People often lie in pursuit of material gain, personal
convenience, or escaping from punishment.
• White lying [143]: Normal standards for the lighthearted type of deception.
• Belief [36]: A truth in somebody’s mind, truth basis.
• Misbelief [36]: A misplaced belief (i.e., mistakenly believing in false information)
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• Perception [36]: The state of being aware of something through the senses.
E.2.2 Spectrum of Deception. In daily life and social networks, deception spans a spectrum of
verbal and non-verbal behaviors. This section lists a few of the various deceptions based on [42,
135, 147].
• White lies [135]: Harmless lies to avoid hurting other’s feelings and smooth relationships.
• Humorous lies [147]: Jokes that are obvious lies, such as practical jokes.
• Altruistic lies [135]: Good lies for protecting others, such as for preventing children fromworrying.
• Defensive lies [135]: Lies to protect the deceiver, such as lies to get rid of repeated telemarketers.
• Aggressive lies [135]: Lies to deceive others for the benefit of the deceivers.
• Pathological lies [135]: Lies by a deceiver with psychological disorder.
• Nonverbal minimization [42]: Understating an important case in nonverbal camouflage.
• Nonverbal exaggeration [42]: Overstating an important case to hide others.
• Nonverbal neutralization [42]: Intentionally hiding normal emotions when inquired about emo-
tional things.
• Nonverbal substitution [135]: Intentionally changing a sensitive concept with a less sensitive one.
• Self-deception [135]: Pushing of a reality into the subconsciousness.
Fig. A2 represents the spectrum of deception from the lowest detectability to the highest de-
tectability and from lowest bad intent (good intent) to no intent and to highest bad intent. In general,
the deception with lower detectability are more with good intent, such as altruistic lies and white
lies. Nonverbal deception are usually with bad intent and can be detected by professionals. Those
behaviors can also be used as cues to detect lies. The deceptions with neutral intent can also be
easily detected.
F SUSCEPTIBILITY TO ONLINE SOCIAL DECEPTION
Attackers aim to achieve their attack goals as efficient as possible with minimum cost. To this end,
the attackers may target highly susceptible people to the OSD attacks. In this section, we discuss
the following key susceptability traits to the OSD attacks: demographic, personality, cultural, social
and economic, and network structure feature-based factors. This survey will provide insights on how
to protect people with different levels of susceptability to the OSD attacks.
F.1 Demographic Susceptible Factors
The commonly used demographic factors related to susceptibility to OSD attacks are as follows:
• Age: Sheng et al. [146] conducted an extensive survey with 1,001 online survey respondents and
found young age groups between 18 and 25 are more susceptible to phishing than other age
groups. Berson et al. [11] and Wolak et al. [179] discussed a new medium for the victimization
of children and sexual exploitation in cyberspace. They studied demographics, online habits,
online interaction patterns, and high-risk youths and risky online behaviors to design prevention
mechanism.
• Gender: Sheng et al. [146] observed in their experiment that women are more susceptible to
phishing than men. Oliveira et al. [121] and Lin et al. [103] further examined phishing suscepti-
bility in terms of age groups based on the 21-day observations on their online activities. They
found old women as the most vulnerable groups.
• Education: Sheng et al. [146] showed in their experiment that educational materials were 40%
more effective in reducing phishing susceptibility.
• Perception and Knowledge: In online seller deception, most consumer victims cannot detect the
fraud from sellers [59]. In behavioral science research, perceived capabilities to detect a risk [180]
and knowledge about risk [108] have been often examined as a predictor to avoid such risk.
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However, prior research provided different findings on the effect of perception and knowledge on
social deception. Wright et al. [180] found no relationship between perceived self-efficacy/risk
and deception detection, concluding that no significant effect of such perception is found on
social deception. Xun et al. [185] modeled user-phishing interactions in which the model allows
to investigate how a user’s perception can be a predictor of detecting phishing attacks.
F.2 Personality Traits-based Susceptible Factors
An individual’s personality traits are studied to investigate their impact on susceptibility to scams
or phishing attacks [31, 44, 63, 64, 113, 126, 127] using the Big Five personality traits model [162].
However, due to the sample bias and lack of subjects covering a wide range of personality traits,
the findings are not generalizable. In order to overcome the issues of limited sampling, Cho et al.
[26] developed a mathematical model based on Stochastic Petri Nets to investigate the effect of
user personality traits on phishing susceptibility. They used Big Five personality model to consider
a user’s perceived trust and risk towards phishing attacks, which are the key factors to phishing
susceptibility. However, their work is purely based on a probability model without using human
subjects which lacks empirical validation. Ding et al. [38] classified phishing emails in terms of
their corresponding target victims based on personality traits. To this end, the authors constructed
a dictionary based on semantic similarity of prospective words corresponding to the personality
traits. However, this work didn’t validate their model based on the empirical study to measure the
actual user susceptibility.
As many deceptive attacks are widespread and online activities become the part of everyday
life in most people, an human individual’s susceptibility to online deception or attacks has been
studied in the recent research in computing and computer science fields. Albladi and Weir [6]
studied a user’s susceptibility to social engineering attack by proposing a user-centric framework
considering socio-psychological, habitual, socio-emotional, and perceptual user attributes.
F.3 Cultural Susceptible Factors
Culture has been defined in various forms. However, it has not been proved if there exists a clear
relationship between culture and its effect on individual’s communication and/or behaviors [25]. A
well-known classification of cultural values is Hofstede’s two cultural dimensions [71]: individualism
vs. collectivism. In the individualistic culture, individuals are loosely tied to one another and a
sense of ‘I’ and an individual’s ‘privacy’ are valued. On the other hand, in the collectivistic culture,
individuals are tightly connected emphasizing ‘we-ness’ and ‘belongings’ to each other. Since culture
has been studied as a key factor impacting trust in a society where trust affects deceptive behavior,
existing studies also have looked at how culture influences deception. For example, individuals from
collectivistic culture (e.g., East Asia countries) were more apt to employ deception [101] or to be
deceptive in business negotiation than those from individualistic culture (e.g., Western countries).
However, these studies were conducted in offline worlds.
F.4 Social and Economic Susceptible Factors
Social media becomes one of prevalent communication tools, being unavoidable part of our modern
life across different socio-demographic groups. Vulnerable status in a socio-economic ladder in
the off-line world seems to be transferable to the online world. For example, low education and/or
income may influence the level of knowledge and awareness about online social deception (or
phishing) or related threat [81, 154]. However, previous studies discussed in Section F.1 showed a
lack of empirical evidence due to inconsistent findings on the relationships between individual
characteristics related to social and economic status [81].
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F.5 Network Structure Feature-based Susceptible Factors
Network structure features have been used to predict the extent of susceptibility to social bots in
online social networks. Wagner et al. [170] found that a user’s out-degree is identified as a key
network feature social bots can target as their victim. In addition, susceptible users tend to be more
active (e.g., retweet, mention, follow or reply) in the Twitter network and interact with more users,
but their communication is mainly for conversational purpose rather than informational purpose.
Susceptible users tend to use more social words and show more affection. Similarly, in Facebook,
susceptible users tend to more engage in posting activities with less restrictive privacy settings,
naturally resulting in higher vulnerability to privacy threats [63]. Social isolation (loneliness)
and risk-taking online behaviors are the indirect factors of vulnerable people, such as victims of
cybergrooming [176, 178]. Albladi and Weir [6] analyzed various user characteristics, such as a
level of involvement, for vulnerability of social engineering attacks.
Engagement in social media is one of the most prominent attributes contributing to high suscep-
tibility to social deception. Habitual use of social media measured by the size of social network and
time spent in social media increases the likelihood of being victims for social attacks in OSNs [165].
Highly active social network users can be more favorable targets for attackers as they have more
exposures to social media and accomplish their attacks through the active users’ networks [6].
Individuals highly engaged in social media can be inattentive and automatically respond to online
communications, being more susceptible to social deception. In addition, cybercrime research found
that the more use of social media is significantly associated with a higher level of risks for sexual
exploitation [11, 179] and cyberbullying [40].
G METRICS
This section gives the detailed explanation of metrics surveyed in this work, related to Section 9.2
of the main paper.
• Confusion Matrix [10, 16, 21, 29, 39, 45, 46, 57, 72, 79, 80, 82, 85, 90, 96, 97, 102, 104, 106, 118, 138,
141, 148, 149, 152, 153, 159, 166, 173, 187]: The confusion matrix is made of True Positive (TP),
False Positive (FP), True Negative (TN), and False Negative (FN). They are the basic components
for other accuracy metrics, such as precision and recall.
• Precision [10, 16, 21, 29, 39, 46, 57, 72, 74, 79, 80, 82, 90, 96, 102, 104, 118, 138, 141, 149, 159, 163,
182, 184, 189]: This metric simply estimates the true positives over positives detected including
true positives and false positives by:
Precision = TP
TP + FP
(1)
• Recall [16, 21, 29, 39, 46, 57, 72, 74, 79, 80, 82, 96, 102, 104, 118, 138, 149, 159, 182, 184, 189]:
This metric captures the true positives over the actual positives include true positives and false
negatives. This metric is estimated by:
Recall = TP
TP + FN
(2)
• F1 Score or Measure [16, 21, 29, 37, 39, 46, 57, 72, 74, 79, 80, 96–98, 102, 138, 159, 182, 184]: This
metric is an indicator of the accuracy of detection based on both precision and recall. It is
measured by:
F1 =
2 × Precision × Recall
Precision + Recall (3)
• Accuracy [9, 10, 12, 29, 37, 39, 45, 56, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 96–98, 105, 106, 118, 141, 149, 159, 166, 182,
184, 188]: This metric measures correct detection for true positives and true negatives. However,
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when the datasets are not balanced such as too large true positives with too small true negatives
or vice-versa, this metric may mislead. It is given by:
Accuracy = TP +TN
TP +TN + FP + FN
(4)
There is also a weighted accuracy score [12] with different weights on labels. Accuracy can also
be used to evaluate the contribution of each features or feature sets [74, 141, 166, 182].
• False Positive Rate (FPR) [9, 21, 45, 98, 138, 148, 153, 159, 173, 188]: This metric is to measure
misdetection in terms of false alarms among the ones detected as positives and computed by:
FPR = FP
FP +TN
(5)
• False Negative Rate (FNR) [9, 10, 98, 173, 188]: This metric captures howmany positives are missed
and is estimated by:
FNR = FN
TP + FN
(6)
• Specificity [10, 21, 29, 138, 148]: This metric measures the extent of correctly detecting negatives
over the actual number of negatives and is obtained by:
Specificity = TN
TN + FP
= 1 − FPR (7)
• Weighted Cost (Wcost ) [188]: In phishing detection, since the ratio of legitimate websites to
phishing website is high, a legitimate website misclassified to a phishing one (FPR) has severe
effects than the reverse (FNR). The weighted cost is used to balance the performance of FPR and
FNR.Wcost is estimated by:
Wcost = FNR + λ × FPR, λ > 1. (8)
where λ is the weight of FPR. Higher values of λ means larger influence of FPR value.
• Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve [10, 74, 95, 148, 149, 173]: ROC curve draws a plot
of classifier’s true positive rate (TPR) against FPR at various detection threshold scenarios. This
curve is used to measure and compare stability between several classifier models.
• Area Under the Curve (AUC) [10, 16, 22, 57, 74, 90, 95, 97, 98, 138, 148]: AUC is calculated by the
the area under the ROC curve. It measures the probability of a classifier to correctly identify a
true-positive data. Since AUC is insensitive to imbalance between classes, it can be better than
Accuracy in evaluating imbalanced dataset. AUC is another metric of classifier stability and
classification quality for different settings.
• Discounted Cumulative Gain (DCG) [125]: DCG measures the effectiveness of an algorithm, an
alternative measure to AUC. A higher DCG is indictive of an early identification of suspicious
cases and estimated by:
DCG = r [1] +
n∑
i=2
r [i]
log2 i
, (9)
where r [i] is 1 if the ith friend request was defined as suspicious or 0 if the ith friend request
was defined as legitimate, and n is the number of total incoming requests that require further
investigation [125].
• Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) [29, 57, 138, 159]:MCCmeasures the correlation between
predicted class and real class of users. This metric is considered as the unbiased version of
F1-measure and given by:
MCC = TP × (TN − FP) × FN√(TP + FN )(TP + FP)(TN + FP)(TN + FN ) , (10)
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where MCC ≈ 1 means high prediction accuracy. MCC ≈ 0 means the prediction is no better
than random guessing. MCC ≈ −1 means that the prediction is in disagreement with the real
class.
• Cohen’s Kappa Value (κ) [37]: This metric is a measure of reliability for two classifiers or raters,
which considers true positive agreement by chance. Cohen’s Kappa Value is used when Accuracy
alone is insufficient to evaluate model reliability [37]. Cohen’s Kappa is calculated as:
κ =
Po − Pe
1 − Pe (11)
where Po is the observed agreement in classification, the same as Accuracy, and Pe is the hypo-
thetical probability of agreement by chance. High Cohen’s Kappa Value (0.8 ≤ κ ≤ 1) indicates
good reliability [17].
• Mean Absolute Error (MAE) [78, 181]: Many detection algorithms for OSD attacks use MAE to
estimate their detection accuracy. In addition, this metric is used to measure the simulation fitting
error of an epidemic model by calculating the absolute values of errors at each time points.
MAE = 1|U |
∑
i ∈U
|pi − li |, (12)
whereU is a user set, pi is a prediction result, li is a true label, and i is a data index.
• 2-norm Error [78]: This measures the simulation fitting error of an epidemic model as one of the
performance measures of model fitting and optimization. A good model would reduce this error
through iterations. This metric is estimated by:
2-norm Error = ∥ I(t) − Tweets(t) ∥
2
∥ Tweets(t) ∥2 , (13)
where I(t) is the number of users (agent I) that spread the rumor tweet at time t . Tweets(t) is the
number of tweets at time t from the real data.
• Mean Fraction of Recovered Agents Per Time Unit (R) [27]: This is a specific case of the statistics and
plot metric. Instead of plotting the count of each agent at each time point, the average fraction of
recovered agents during the total session time T is calculated.
R =
∑T
t=1 R(t)
T
, (14)
where R(t) is the number of agents recovered from false information (i.e., not believing in false
information) and T is the total simulation time.
• Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient (ρ) [45, 77]: This metric measures the rank correlation
between the predicted labels and the ground truth and is obtained by:
ρ = 1 − 6
∑
d2i
n(n2 − 1) , (15)
where n ranks are distinct integers and di is the difference of two ranks between an element.
ρ ranges in [−1, 1] as a real number where 0 refers to random guess while 1 indicates positive
correlation [177].
• Label Ranking Average Precision (LRAP) [77]: This measures the ability to give more accurate
prediction for each post message, with a prefect prediction of 1. LRAP is measured by:
LRAP = 1
n
n−1∑
i=0
1
∥ yi ∥0
∑
j,yi j=1
|Li j |
ranki j
, (16)
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where n is number of data points, yi is the vector of ground truth labels of the ith data point,
∥ · ∥0 is number of non-zero elements in a vector, yi j is the binary label of jth label from ground
truth vector yi , |Li j | is number of positive labels for a given data point i , and ranki j is the rank
of predicted label (pi j ) in predicted label vector (pi ) for a given i [140].
• Label Ranking Loss (LRL) [77]: This metric estimates the number of times that irrelevant labels are
ranked higher than relevant labels. Due to its large volume of complex description, the interested
readers can refer to [161] for more details.
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